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'Now! Now!' cried the Queen, 'Faster! Faster!' And they went so
fast that at last they seemed to skim through the air, hardly
touching the ground with their feet, till suddenly, just as Alice
was getting quite exhausted, they stopped, and she found herself
sitting on the ground, breathless and giddy.
The Queen propped her up against a tree, and said kindly,'You
must rest a little, now.'
Alice looked round her in great surprise. 'Why, I do believe
we've been under this tree the whole time! Everything's just as it
was!'
'Of course it is,' said the Queen. 'Now, here you see, it takes all
the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to
get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!'
-Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland
I. INTRODUCTION
T he "gentle readers"-as they were politely addressed in Victorian
days-may be surprised by the analogy suggested between the
reform of landlord-tenant law and the experience of Alice and the Queen.
However, the events surrounding the enactment of Amended Substitute
Senate Bill 1031 were as perplexing as those in Lewis Carroll's story.
Those opposing real reform, principally the real estate industry, 2 were
successful in weakening the proposed legislation. Consequently, the
primary goal of the sponsors of landlord-tenant legislation in Ohio, i.e.,
the true equalization of the relationship between landlords and tenants,
was not met by the legislation finally enacted. As this Article will
demonstrate, the interpretation of the Act by the courts of Ohio has
proven true the claims of some of the proponents of the reform legislation
who likened the final enacted bill to the March Hare: a little bit late and
somewhat confusing.
The purpose of this Article is to review this legislation and its
interpretation by the Ohio courts over the past thirteen years. Like Alice,
the gentle reader may conclude that despite all this running, "[elvery-
thing's just as it was." For this reason, the authors will propose legisla-
' Amend. Sub. S. B. 103 was passed on July 23, 1974, and became effective on
November 4, 1974. The new law, The Landlord and Tenant Reform Act of 1974 [hereinafter
the Act], consists of a revision of the existing chapter of the Ohio Revised Code treating
forcible entry and detainer, Ohno REv. CODE ANN. ch. 1923 (Anderson Supp. 1986), and an
entirely new chapter of the Code treating landlord and tenant relations, OHiO REv. CODE ANN.
ch. 5321 (Anderson Supp. 1986).
2 Snook, Real Estate Interests Fight Tough Tenant Bill for Ohio, The Plain Dealer
(Cleveland), Jan. 21, 1974, at Al, col. 4; See also Baillis, Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act of.1974,
3 Omo N.U.L. REv. 122, 127 n.18 (1975)[hereinafter Baillis].
[Vol. 36:157
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol36/iss2/3
OHIO LANDLORD-TENANT REFORM
tive amendments to the Act necessary to bring into more equitable
balance the landlord-tenant relationship in Ohio.
II. CHANGES IN LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP BY THE ACT
The impetus behind the 1974 Act was a realization that the traditional
principles of property law that had governed the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship, such as "caveat lessee"3 were anachronistic and unworkable in
a non-agrarian Ohio.4 This "transformation" of landlord-tenant law was
in large part a by-product of the civil rights movement in America during
the Sixties. 5 The fundamental change wrought by the Act was the
abandonment of some of the outmoded legal constructs of property law
that had led to substantial inequities. In exchange, new rules assigned
responsibilities to the parties on the realistic basis that only the landlord
could rationally be held responsible for maintenance of the property.6
Prior to the passage of the Act, tenants had few rights with respect to
the property they were renting and fewer remedies. 7 For instance, under
common law, a tenant could be held responsible for maintenance of the
premises. However, in an attempt to equalize the relationship, specific
obligations for landlords and tenants were created in the Act. Landlords
are required to make all reasonable and necessary repairs to maintain
the premises in a fit and habitable condition,8 while the tenant must keep
that part of the premises he occupies and uses in safe and sanitary
condition. 9 These co-extensive and dependent obligations were designed
to improve the quality of housing stock in Ohio.1O
Also, under common law, the landlord was free to utilize the ultimate
weapon, eviction, against a tenant who complained about the conditions
of the property. Neither the Ohio nor federal judiciary would interpose
' Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Conse-
quences, 69 CORNELL L. Rrv. 517, 521 (1984) [hereinafter Rabin]. Just as the legal maxim
"caveat emptor" meaning "let the buyer beware" operated to deny consumers any redress,
until recently many court decisions refused to place any responsibility for repairs and
maintenance on landlords based on the premise that because the tenant had the opportunity
to inspect the apartment prior to leasing, the tenant took the property "as is". Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
' Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 24-25, 427 N.E.2d 774, 777 (1981);
Baillis, supra note 2, at 122-33.
5 Rabin, supra note 3, at 546-49.
e Campion, The Ohio Landlord and Tenant Reform Act of 1974, 25 CA.sE W. Has. 876,
876-77 (1975) [hereinafter Landlord-Tenant]. For an excellent discussion of the division of
responsibilities, see id. at 878-82.
' See, e.g., Note, Covenant of Habitability and the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Legislation, 23
CLEv. Sr. L. Rv. 539, 539-40 (1974)[hereinafter Covenant of Habitability].
s Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A)(1) (Anderson 1981).
9Oro REv. CODE AN. § 5321.05(A)(1) (Anderson 1981).
10 Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6, at 878-82.
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any ameliorating relief even if the eviction was based on unconstitutional
motives." The Act prohibits retaliatory conduct such as threatening or
filing forcible entry and detainer actions when the tenant complains of
conditions to either the landlord or an appropriate government
authority. 12
Another ill remedied was the unequal bargaining power between the
two parties. 13 Previously, tenants had little leverage to ensure that their
landlord provided quality housing or fair treatment. Too often they faced
standardized lease forms and an attitude of take it or leave it. For this
reason, the Ohio General Assembly enacted a provision which voids any
lease terms which are inconsistent with the Act. 14
These and the other provisions of the Act were to establish a new legal
position for landowners and renters. Advocates for tenants' rights were
hopeful that a new day for equality was dawning with the passage of the
Act. Yet, they were aware that the interpretation of the Act by the courts
would determine whether that dawn would come.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW SINCE 1974
It is axiomatic that laws are not self-executing. Under our system of
government the courts are vested with the power to interpret the intent
and scope of statutory rights and duties.' 5
Ohio courts are mandated liberally to construe reform statutes in order
to effectuate their objectives.' 6 The Act should therefore be given broad
and liberal construction. Doubts about any provisions should be con-
strued in favor of the persons whom the legislation was enacted to
protect, namely tenants.17
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized these reform-minded underpin-
nings of the Act in its seminal decision of Shroades v. Rental Homes,
Inc.18 Chief Justice Celebrezze, writing for the majority, observed that:
" Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd, 532 F.2d 1061
(6th Cir. 1976).
12 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Anderson 1981).
"3 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
14 Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.06 (Anderson 1981).
s Omo CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
16 Rose v. King, 49 Ohio St. 213, 30 N.E. 267 (1892). Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.11
(Anderson 1980) leaves no question as to this rule: "[riemedial laws and all proceedings
under them shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the
parties in obtaining justice." (emphasis added).
17 See Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955); Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337
U.S. 783, 790 (1948); Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 409 (1945).
18 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).
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In light of previous common law immunity of landlords, and in
recognition of the changed rental conditions and the definite
trend to provide tenants with greater rights, the General Assem-
bly enacted R.C. Chapter 5321 in 1974. We agree with the
majority in Thrash, supra, insofar as the Act was an attempt to
balance the competing interests of landlords and tenants....
Thus the new remedies given tenants in R.C. Chapter 5321 are
intended to be preventive and supplemental to other remedial
measures....
We conclude that the General Assembly intended both to
provide tenants with greater rights and to negate the previous
tort immunities for landlords.19
The Shroades decision signified a major breakthrough in the interpre-
tation of the Act. By viewing its provisions expansively, the court armed
tenants with a remedy theretofore denied them. Unfortunately, the Ohio
Supreme Court and the other courts of Ohio have not always interpreted
the Act in such a fashion and have often limited the remedies seemingly
provided by the Act. The subsequent sections of the Article will explore
the extent to which Ohio courts have followed the intent of the drafters of
the Act.2
0
A. Coverage of the Law
The Act contains a definitions section2l in which important terms are
defined and exclusions from coverage are outlined. Not every type of
living arrangement is addressed in the Act. Moreover, the degree to
which the common law was abrogated by the new statute was-and
remains-a crucial question needing a final determination by the courts.
The extent to which the Act covers various types of residential
19 Id. at 24-25, 427 N.E.2d at 777 (citing Thrash v. Hill, 63 Ohio St. 2d 178, 407 N.E.2d
495 (1980)).
20 In determining legislative intent, Ohio courts must follow specific statutory guide-
lines:
[Court consideration as a legislative intent.]
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
legislature, may consider among other matters:
(A) The object sought to be attained;
(B) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
(C) The legislative history;
(D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the
same or similar subjects;
(E) The consequences of a particular construction;
(F) The administrative construction of the statute.
Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 1.49 (Anderson 1981).
21 Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 5321.01 (Anderson Supp. 1985).
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premises was limited.22 Many of the exclusions are related to residences
in which persons rent for a short period, usually one night at a time, 23
while persons in institutional living situations are also excluded.24
However, the listing in section 5321.01 does not specifically cover or
exclude several living situations, and the courts have been called upon to
resolve disputes. For example, sublessors have been included in the Act's
coverage, since they have been determined to have the same rights and
duties as an original lessor. 26 On the other hand, it has been determined
that the Act does not apply to cooperatives.26
Other questions have not been susceptible to such precise answers. For
instance, whether an occupant of a hotel, motel, YMCA or other similar
facility is covered by the Act will depend on the particular circumstances
of each case. Factors to be considered include whether the occupant is
entitled to the use and occupancy of the unit to the exclusion of others27
and whether the circumstances indicate transient occupancy. 28 In at-
tempting to address the second factor, the courts have generally applied
common law criteria. 29
22 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (Anderson Supp. 1985).
23 OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(C)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1985) excludes tourist homes,
hotels, motels and other similar facilities where circumstances indicate a transient
occupancy.
24 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(C)(4), (5) (Anderson Supp. 1985). These subsections
exclude boarding schools when room and board are included as part of the tuition cost,
orphanages, and other similar institutions. See also Owo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(C)(1).
This subsection excludes prisons, jails and places of incarceration as well as halfway houses
or other residences occupied as part of a probation or parole program.
25 Colony by the Mall v. Duckro, No. CA 6169 (Montgomery County, June 29, 1979).
20 Kohler v. Snow Village, 16 Ohio App. 3d 350, 475 N.E.2d 1298 (1984). The Kohler
court found that cooperative occupancy agreements are not rental agreements as defined in
Otuo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(D) (Anderson 1981). The key to the court's decision was that,
as defined in the Act, a rental agreement requires "parties", i.e., landlord and tenant. In
cooperatives the occupancy agreement creates a common sharehold ownership and makes
the unit owner both a landlord and tenant. Further, a landlord-tenant arrangement
requires the tenant to pay monthly rent while in a cooperative the only monthly payment
is the unit holder's proportionate share of the cooperative's maintenance expenses and
mortgage. Finally, this monthly payment was not for the use and occupancy of the unit as
found in the definition of rental agreement. Yet, if the unit is rented by its owner to a third
party unrelated to the condominium or cooperative association, the law may apply. The
theory is that the original owner cannot at the same time be both a common part owner, i.e.,
a landlord, and a tenant. However, once he rents the unit to a third party, the tenancy
resembles the traditional landlord-tenant relationship and thus may be covered by the Act.
It should be noted that condominium ownership was specifically excluded from the
residential landlord-tenant law. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(C)(8) (Anderson Supp. 1985).
27 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(A) (Anderson Supp. 1985).
2s OQo REV. CoDE ANN. § 5321.01(C) (Anderson Supp. 1985).
29 In Baker v. Doubletree, Inc., No. 81 CA 38 (Miami County, Feb. 19, 1982) the Court
of Appeals for Miami County stated in dicta that a motel is merely a structure and persons
living in a motel are not necessarily excluded from the coverage of the Act; rather than
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol36/iss2/3
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Factors which support the finding of a tenancy covered by the Act
include: monthly or weekly rental payments rather than daily payments;
payment of a security deposit; furniture totally or partially supplied by
the tenant; occupancy for a lengthy or specified period of time as opposed
to very short, temporary or day-to-day indefinite occupancy; occupant
responsibility for cleaning and housekeeping; utilities, such as phone
service, paid by occupant rather than being included in the bill; numer-
ous possessions of occupant in the unit;30 and whether or not a sales tax
is paid by the occupant.3 1
The Act's definition of the term "landlord" is extremely broad.32 The
meaning of the term "landlord" may be different depending on the specific
provision of the Act being litigated. For example, the Franklin County
Court of Appeals discussed the meaning of this term in the context of a
security deposit case.33 The court found that, for the purpose of security
deposit litigation, a landlord is the person who has and retains the
tenant's funds.34
examining the application of the law the court should look to the terms of the occupancy
agreement and other surrounding circumstances such as the fact that this particular motel
rented rooms on both short and long term leases.
" See, e.g., Howard v. Shangri-La Inn, No. 48219 (Cuyahoga County, Nov. 29,
1984)(despite the fact that a hotel resident signed a register and paid hotel taxes, other
factors indicated the existence of a factual issue as to whether the plaintiff was a tenant
under the Act).
31 Each county is empowered to levy a hotel tax on "transient guests." Orno REv. ConE
ANN. § 5739.024 (Anderson 1981). "Transient guests" are defined by the Code as "persons
occupying a room for sleeping accomodations for less than thirty consecutive days." Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 5339.01(B)(2) (Anderson 1981).
32 The Code defines "landlord" as the "owner, lessor or sublessor of residential premises,
his agent, or any person authorized by him to manage the premises or to receive rent from
a tenant under a rental agreement." Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(B) (Anderson Supp.
1985)
3 Ford v. Club S. Inv. Co., No. 86AP-559 (Franklin County, Dec. 16, 1986).
s Id. at 4-5. The Court held that;
Although broadly construed the definition of "landlord" set forth in R.C.
5321.01(B) would include anyone connected with the rental of a premises,
including a clerk in an office who physically receives rent checks on behalf of his
employer, we do not find that R.C. 5321.16 contemplates that every such person
will be personally liable for return of the security deposit. Rather, although the
word "landlord" may have meanings and applications, it is the apparent intent of
R.C. 5321.16 that the landlord for the purposes of that section is the person who
has and retains the security deposit.
The result in this case protected the tenant. However, the decision could lead to unfair
results if applied generally. What happens to the situation when the property is sold and the
former landlord keeps the security deposit of the tenant? The tenant may be faced with a
situation where his deposit is not returned but the new landlord is insulated from any
litigation over the violation of the Act. As a policy decision, the statute should be amended
to place the obligation on the new landlord who is in a better position to secure the deposit
1988]
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One question the Act seems to answer differently than did common law
is the status of the person residing in a dwelling unit pursuant to an
employment contract, such as a resident custodian of an apartment
building who is provided an apartment in exchange for services. Such an
employment contract is arguably a rental agreement under the Act since
the contract would establish rules and conditions concerning the use and
occupancy of residential premises.3 5 If so, the employee/tenant would
presumably be entitled to the protections of the Act. 36
Another question regarding the coverage of Chapter 5321 concerns the
status of persons who rent manufactured homes (also commonly termed
"mobile homes") in manufactured home parks. Chapter 3733 of the Ohio
Revised Code governs the relationship between manufactured home
parks and the park residents. That Chapter was originally enacted to
provide coverage to manufactured homeowners who rented lots in parks
and was modeled after Chapter 5321.37
Persons who reside in a manufactured home park but do not own their
homes, renting them either from the park or from other persons, are in a
different situation than homeowners who only rent lots for their homes.
Persons renting the homes themselves have been covered by Chapter
5321.38 Due to recent amendments to Chapter 3733,39 they may instead,
or also, be covered by Chapter 3733.
during the negotiations for the sale of the premises. See infra text accompanying notes
386-87.
" Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(D) (Anderson Supp. 1985).
36 For instance, if the employment contract/rental agreement is being terminated for
conduct of the employee tenant which violates both the agreement and the statutory duties
of a tenant as set forth in Revised Code section 5321.05, the employee/tenant may be
entitled to notice of the violation and an opportunity to cure pursuant to Revised Code
section 5321.11 OieO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.05, 5321.11 (Anderson 1981). Cf Sandefur
Mgmt. Co. v. Wilson, 21 Ohio App. 3d 160, 486 N.E.2d 1267 (1985); Parker v. Fisher, 17
Ohio App. 3d 103, 477 N.E.2d 654 (1984).
" Kramer, Buchanan & Sobol, Reforming the Mobile Home Tenant-Landlord Relation-
ship: The Ohio Experience, 30 CLv. ST. L. REv. 57, 61 (1981).
31 Schwartz v. McAtee, 22 Ohio St. 3d 14, 19 n.2, 488 N.E.2d 479, 483 n.2 (1986).
" Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.01(J), (K), (L) (Anderson Supp. 1987). The new definitions
state:
(J) "Tenant" means a person who is entitled under a rental agreement with a
manufactured home park operator to occupy a manufactured home park lot and
who does not own the manufactured home occupying the lot.
(K) "Owner" means a person who is entitled under a rental agreement with a
manufacturered home park operator to occupy a manufactured home park lot and
who owns the manufactured home occupying the lot.
(L) "Resident" means a person entitled under a rental agreement to the use and
occupancy of residential premises to the exclusion of others. It includes both
tenants and owners.
Thus, a tenant who does not own the home and also rents the lot, is governed by the
provisions of Chapter 3733 as far as his relationship with the park is concerned. However,
[Vol. 36:157
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The greatest controversy over the coverage of the Act has been whether
the common law is still viable in the face of the statute, or whether it was
significantly modified and in some cases pre-empted. Several Ohio
Supreme Court cases have addressed the issue, beginning with Thrash v.
Hill,40 in which the court determined that the statutory scheme was not
the sole source of remedy for tenants for a violation of the landlord's
duties. Thus, the court found no landlord tort liability because none was
provided under the new law and none had existed at common law.4 1 The
following year, however, in Strayer v. Lindeman42 and Shroades v. Rental
Homes, Inc.,43 the court reversed Thrash and found a landlord and his
agents liable for injuries suffered by a tenant. In the latter case a
plurality found that section 5321.12 allows recovery under both the Act
and the common law for a landlord's negligence resulting in an injury to
his tenant.44 Where the two schemes of law clash, however, it is clear that
the statutory scheme has superseded the common law, and the rights of
landlords and tenants are determined by Chapter 5321. 45
The coverage and definitions of the Act should be so construed by the
courts as to effectuate the purpose of the law. As is demonstrated
elsewhere in this Article, such construction has not always occurred.
Therefore, in order to promote the purpose of the Act, the authors suggest
enactment of provisions spelling out legislative findings46 as to the
purpose and policies of the Act. The authors further suggest codifying the
decisions recognizing the continued viability of common law remedies.47
B. Landlord Obligations
Perhaps the most important of all the provisions in the Act is section
5321.04, which prescribes certain obligations for landlords. This provi-
sion marked a major change from the common law which, except for one
notable exception, 48 imposed virtually no obligations on landlords regard-
ing the leased premises beyond allowing the tenant to occupy it undis-
it would seem that the tenant's relationship with the owner of the home he is renting,
whether it be the park or an individual, would still be governed by Chapter 5321 since that
person would also qualify as a tenant under Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(A) (Anderson
1981).
40 63 Ohio St. 2d 178, 407 N.E.2d 495 (1980).
41 See Note, Torts and Landlord-Tenant Act-Thrash v. Hill, 50 U. C. L. REV. 134
(1981).
42 68 Ohio St. 2d 32, 427 N.E.2d 781 (1981).
43 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).
- Id. at 25, 427 N.E.2d at 777.
4' Krutsch v. Republic Steel Corp., No. 42062 (Cuyahoga County, Oct. 1, 1981).
46 MODEL REsIDENTuIL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 1-102 (1969) suggests such a finding. See
infra text setting forth Proposed Amendments to the current statute.
4 See, e.g., UNw. RFsmENTiAL LADLoa-TEN~r AcT § 1-103, 7B U.L.A. 435 (1987).
48 Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972).
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turbed by the landlord.4s No duty to repair was imposed upon the
landlord6 and no warrant of habitability was implied.51 In enacting a
Landlord-Tenant law which specified a list of obligations for landlords the
legislature clearly signaled that this provision should be construed to
broaden not only the obligations of landlords but also the rights of
tenants.
5 2
The obligations of a landlord under section 5321.04 are described in
both general 53 and specific terms.M These obligations apply to the entire
leased premises and are not restricted to the common areas.55 Delegation
of a statutory duty will not insulate the landlord from liability for
physical harm arising from the negligent performance of these prescribed
duties by a third party.56 Indeed, a violation of a statutory duty which
results in injury to a tenant is negligence per se.5 7
Despite the plain language of the Act, novel defenses for the failure to
perform these obligations have been raised. One landlord argued that his
obligation to supply an air conditioner in good and safe working order did
4 See Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6, at 878-79.
o Goodall v. Peters, 121 Ohio St. 432, 169 N.E.2d 443 (1929).
s' Branham v. Fordyce, 103 Ohio App. 379, 145 N.E.2d 471 (1957).
52 See Covenant of Habitability, supra note 7.
s' General obligations under section 5321.04 include:
(A) A landlord who is party to a rental agreement shall:
(1) Comply with the requirements of all applicable building, housing, health,
and safety codes which materially affect health and safety;
(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep
the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) Keep all common areas of the premises in a safe and sanitary condition;
(4) Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning fixtures and
appliances, and elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Anderson 1981).
54 Specific obligations under section 5321.04 include:
(5) When he is a party to any rental agreements that cover four or more
dwelling units in the same structure, provide and maintain appropriate recepta-
cles for the removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the
occupancy of the dwelling unit, and arrange for their removal;
(6) Supply running water, reasonable amounts of hot water and reasonable heat
at all times, except where the building that includes the dwelling unit is not
required by law to be equipped for that purpose, or the dwelling unit is so
constructed that heat or hot water is generated by an installation within the
exclusive control of the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility connection.
Id.
s Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 26, 427 N.E.2d 774, 778 (1981).
s Strayer v. Lindeman, 68 Ohio St. 2d 32, 427 N.E.2d 781 (1981).
17 Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983); Shroades v. Rental
Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 25, 427 N.E.2d 774, 778 (1981).
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not require him to turn it on.58 The court, in rejecting this argument,
declared that,
[t]he Act would furnish no protection to the tenant if read to
merely require the landlord to have a system in working order.
An air conditioner which is turned off results in the same
uninhabitable conditions as one which is broken. The Act re-
quires the equipment to perform when needed.59
Another question concerning landlord obligations that has been liti-
gated is the question of the meaning of the word "supply." This became an
issue in one case because in certain circumstances the obligation to
supply running water, heat, and hot water, pursuant to section
5321.04(A)(6), could be shifted to the tenant.60 In Griffin v. Hulston,61 the
unit lacked heat and water, and the landlord cited Ohio Revised Code
section 5321.04(A)(6) for the proposition that the tenant had the duty to
supply it. The court ruled that the term "supply" should be read to
obligate the tenant for payment of utility charges only, and in no way
relieved the landlord from the obligation to supply the heating and
plumbing fixtures.6 2
More troublesome is the presence of conflicting provisions on the issue
of assigning statutory obligations. Under the Act the landlord may agree
to assume any obligations delegated to the tenant by the Act. 63 This
unambiguous statement should be understood to mean that the right to
delegate is in the nature of a one-way street since there exists no
comparable right for the landlord to delegate any of his obligations to the
tenant. However, another section of the Act imposes responsibility upon
the tenant to "maintain in good working order and condition . . . "
appliances supplied by the landlord which a rental agreement requires
the tenant to maintain.64 Because these sections seem to conflict, they
should be construed in pari materia and, under the rules of construction
for a remedial law 65 should be construed in favor of the tenant. Thus,
58 Howard v. Simon, 18 Ohio App. 3d 14, 15, 480 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1984).
9 Id. at 16, 480 N.E.2d at 102.
o Orno Rav. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A)(6) provides:
(A) A landlord who is a party to a rental agreement shall:
(6) Supply running water, reasonable amounts of hot water and reasonable heat
at all times, except where the building that includes the dwelling unit is not
required by law to be equipped for that purpose or the dwelling unit is so
constructed that heat or hot water is generated by an installation within the
exclusive control of the tenant and supplied by direct public utility connection.
61 No. L-83-261 (Lucas County, Dec. 16, 1983).
62 Id.
6 Omo R v. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(F) (Anderson 1981).
6 Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A)(7) (Anderson 1981).
65 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (Anderson 1981).
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even despite a lease clause making a tenant responsible for maintenance
of appliances, a tenant should not be required to make serious repairs on
appliances (e.g. replace a thermostat or heating element on a stove).
Instead, the tenant should be held responsible merely for routine clean-
ing and maintenance (e.g., cleaning an oven, defrosting a refrigerator).
A comparison of the parts of the Act outlining the respective duties and
obligations of landlords and tenants, and remedies for breach of those
duties, reveals a basic inequity. Under the section of the Act outlining
tenant duties, a landlord can sue for damages together with reasonable
attorney fees whenever a tenant violates any of the obligations
specified.6 6 No comparable provision exists authorizing reasonable attor-
ney fees for successful actions by tenants based on violations by landlords
of the obligations specified under Ohio Revised Code section 5321.04. The
availability of reasonable attorney fees for legal actions by tenants
against landlords for violation of their obligations is limited to landlord
abuse of the right of access. 67 This is an empty gesture in light of the Ohio
rule that in the absence of "actual" damages there can be no award of
attorney fees.68 The act of entering tenant's leasehold without notice is
not likely to produce a pecuniary loss. Thus, the tenant who probably
cannot afford to hire an attorney to prosecute such an action without the
hope of being reimbursed is usually left without an actual remedy for
what may be a serious breach of the duty to respect the tenant's privacy.
69
Moreover, in the event of a violation by the landlord of other obliga-
tions, even a tenant who can prove actual damages cannot recover
attorney fees incurred. Thus, it will be a rare case in which a tenant will
find it economically feasible to retain an attorney to recover such
damages, since the damages are likely to be less than the cost of
litigation. The inherent inequity in allowing the landlord but not the
tenant to recover attorney fees makes little sense, since in most situa-
tions a landlord is more able to absorb legal fees than a tenant.
The Ohio Supreme Court has overruled the several appellate and
district court cases declaring the Act to be the exclusive remedy of
tenants for conduct of landlords.70 In Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc.,71
the court also specifically laid to rest the common law immunities in tort
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(C) (Anderson 1981).
6 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(B) (Anderson 1981).
6 Jemo & Assoc. v. Garman, 70 Ohio St. 2d 267, 272, 436 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (1982).
69 The tenant may be able to claim a breach of the duty of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment. Howard v. Simon, 18 Ohio App. 3d 14, 16-17, 480 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1984). The
court's reliance on the landlord's duty of peaceful and quiet enjoyment is interesting
because the statute only references this covenant among tenant obligations. Omio REv. CODE
ANN. § 5321.05(A)(8) (Anderson 1981). However, the tenant may have the same problem in
proving damages and, of course, attorneys fees are not available in such an action.
70 Laster v. Bowman, 52 Ohio App. 2d 379, 370 N.E.2d 767 (1977).
71 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).
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by declaring the duties imposed on the landlord by the Act to maintain
and repair the premises to be an invocation of a duty to "put and keep the
premises in a fit and habitable condition and protect persons using
rented residential premises from injuries. '72
One example of a common law duty recognized by a post-Act decision is
the covenant of quiet enjoyment.73 However, the Ohio courts have
generally refused to find a common law duty imposed on landlords to
afford protection against intentional criminal acts.74 Yet, the trend seems
to be to recognize such a duty to provide at least reasonable protection. 75
Courts are more likely to recognize a statutory duty to provide a safe
and secure premises, though claims based on that duty have thus far
failed on their facts. 76 If certain security measures were promised by a
landlord and became part of the bargain, a failure to provide such
measures could be the basis for breach of contract claims. 77
The legislature did a fairly thorough job in setting forth the obligations
of landlords in light of modern conceptions of rental property. The only
changes that are really needed as to obligations and duties are, as
indicated above, relatively minor. However, as to remedies, there are
several important deficiencies. Legislative changes are needed. The
authors suggest that the remedies offered to tenants be expanded to be at
least as extensive as those provided to landlords. 78 The change needed
72 Id. at 25, 427 N.E.2d at 778.
71 See Howard, 18 Ohio App. 3d at 16, 480 N.E.2d at 101-02.
74 See Thomas v. Hart Realty, Inc., 17 Ohio App. 3d 83, 477 N.E.2d 668 (1984); Cherkiss
v. Thomas, No. L-83-416 (Lucas County, Apr. 13, 1984).
7' For instance, in Hart Realty the court stressed that the case did not involve criminal
entry or activity in common areas, thus indicating that a different result might be reached
under those circumstances. In Sciascia v. Riverpark Apartments, 3 Ohio App. 3d 164, 444
N.E.2d 40 (1981), the court also recognized a duty on an apartment landlord to undertake
reasonable measures to provide secure common areas. Furthermore, in Runge v. Rosewater,
Nos. 47650 and 47651 (Cuyahoga County, June 14, 1984), the court stated that the landlord
could be held liable if the criminal activity was reasonably forseeable and the landlord's
failure to adhere to the common law and statutory duties regarding safety proximately
caused the tenant's injury. Summary judgment for the landlord was upheld, however,
because of the absence of evidence that the proximate cause of the injury was the landlord's
failure to provide security. Thus, while a duty to provide at least some measure of security
may be recognized, proof of proximate cause is required for liability to ensue.
16 See Cherkiss v. Thomas, No. L-83-416 (Lucas County, Apr. 13, 1984)(entry through
window with defective latch); Emm v. Shesky, No. 79AP-632 (Franklin County, Feb. 14,
1980)(entry through back door with defective lock); Runge v. Rosewater, Nos. 47650 and
47651 (Cuyahoga County, June 14, 1984)(insufficient evidence on whether entry occurred
through door with defective lock).
7 Buncy v. Daniels, No. CA-6059 (Stark County, June 13, 1983)(summary judgment
reversed because, inter alia, the issue whether breach of contractual obligation to provide
secure windows was proximate cause of entry, should have been presented to the jury).
" Compare Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(B) (Anderson 1981) with OIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5321.05(C) (Anderson 1981).
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would be to permit actual damages and attorney fees for any violation of
either the landlord or tenant obligations. 79 It is noteworthy that mobile
home owners who are tenants in mobile home parks enjoy such
remedies.80 Such equality of duty and remedy is long overdue for
apartment tenants and other renters.
C. Impermissible Actions by the Landlord
The Act includes several provisions directed at certain actions that
might be taken by a landlord against a tenant that were for the most part
permitted under common law, but which are now prohibited due to a
combination of the realities of modern living, increased sensibilities as to
the rights and needs of tenants, and the desire to have potentially violent
confrontations defused in the courts. The particular actions which the
General Assembly hoped to prevent were of two categories: (1) self-help
remedies such as eviction and distraint; and (2) actions taken against
tenants because they have exercised some of their newly provided rights.
The Act lists several specific actions a landlord may not take against a
tenant.8 ' The most litigated of those actions prohibited by the landlord-
tenant law are lockouts and property seizures. A lockout occurs when a
landlord excludes a tenant from the premises by changing the locks or
otherwise barring the tenant. A property seizure involves the landlord
exercising some form of control or dominion over the tenant's property.
This control is usually the removal of property and disposal or storage of
it. In litigation arising under this section, the legal issues generally
concern exactly what acts are proscribed, whether the prohibited actions
have occurred, and what damages are available to a tenant who has been
subjected to a landlord's violation of this law.
It should be emphasized that whether or not the tenant is behind in
rent payments or has breached some other obligation is irrelevant under
the Act. The statute is intended to force landlords to seek redress through
the various avenues provided by law, be it an action in forcible entry and
detainer and/or a claim or action for money damages.8 2
The earliest reported case in which a lockout was determined illegal
under the Act was Keener v. Ewert.83 Other courts have reached similar
conclusions that lockouts are prohibited and that damages and attorney
fees are available to the tenant subjected to a lockout.84 The extent of the
7 See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
s Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(B) (Anderson 1981).
81 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.15(A) (Anderson 1981) (termination of utilities, exclusion
from premises or threat of unlawful act); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.15(B) (Anderson
1981)(seizure of property).
12 Teall v. MacKinlay, No. L-81-313 (Lucas County, May 28, 1982).
83 67 Ohio App. 2d 17, 425 N.E.2d 914 (1979).
84 Burroughs v. Douglas, No. 46030 (Cuyahoga County, Dec. 8, 1983); Melvin v. Bryant,
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protected property boundaries is determined by the rental agreement
and, thus, any of the property rented by the tenant is included. For
example, even when the lock was changed on a garage which was
considered part of the residential premises, an illegal lockout was
found.8 5 The limiting factor, however, has been that courts have applied
the protections only to tenants, not to third parties present on the
premises.8 6
The issue of damages and attorney fees has been partially determined
by the statute and partially by judicial interpretation. While the Act
provides for "damages" for violations, and for attorney fees, the question
left unanswered by the General Assembly was what damages were
available.8 7 The extent to which courts have allowed damages ranges
from "minimal" damages and attorney fees88 to $8,000 in compensatory
damages.8 9
Punitive damages provide a harder determination for the courts, with
decisions both allowing and rejecting them. In one reported decision, the
court decided that punitive damages were not available under Ohio
Revised Code section 5321.15.90 While this court remains in the minority,
those which do allow punitive damages require a showing of actual
malice or aggravating circumstances prior to such an award.9 '
The language of the statute which allows a tenant to maintain an
action for "all damages"9 2 would seem to permit an award of punitive
damages. In this respect, this particular section differs from other
sections of the Act providing for damage awards as they simply provide
for "actual damages,"93 or, simply, "damages."94 Thus, it can be argued
No. 7259 (Montgomery County, Nov. 13, 1981); Shultz v. Lovejoy, No. 42408 (Cuyahoga
County, Jan. 22, 1981); Boltz v. McFarland, No. 2-78-14 (Auglaize County, Dec. 6, 1978).
85 Teal v. MacKinlay, No. L-81-313 (Lucas County, May 28, 1982).
88 O'Neil v. Walburg, 70 Ohio App. 2d 30, 433 N.E.2d 1286 (1980). Plaintiff was never
a tenant in this case, but his property was stored with that of the tenant. Evidence showed
that defendant landlord's employee seized the property but there was no evidence that the
plaintiff ever had any relationship with defendant. Id. at 32-33, 433 N.E.2d at 1288.
870io REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.15(C) (Anderson 1981).
s DeGraffenreid v. Torges, No. 82-B-34 (Belmont County, June 29, 1983).
s Melvin v. Bryant, No. 7259 (Montgomery County, Nov. 13, 1981).
' O'Neil, 70 Ohio App. 2d at 30. The holding as to the possibility of recovering punitive
damages can be read as not controlling, since the Court had first decided that section
5321.15 of the Revised Code did not apply and that in any event, the tenant had not proved
the sort of aggravating circumstances that would justify an award of punitive damages. Id.
Moreover, this case involved a commercial rental which may dilute its applicability to
residential premises.
91 Burroughs v. Douglas, No. 46030 (Cuyahoga County, Dec. 8, 1983); Schultz v.
Lovejoy, No. 42408 (Cuyahoga County, Jan. 22, 1981).
92 Thomas v. Papadelis, 16 Ohio App. 3d 359, 476 N.E.2d 726 (1984).
9 See Ofo REv. CODE ANN. 99 5321.02(B)(3), 5321.04(B) and 5321.05(C) (Anderson 1981).
4 See Oieo REv. CoDs ANN. 99 5321.09(D), 5321.12 (Anderson 1981).
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that the language of the statute providing for a fuller recovery for
violation of this particular section than for other violations evinces an
intent by the legislature to authorize an award of punitive damages
under the proper circumstances. The purpose of this section of the Act
was to discourage, among other things, potentially violent self-help
evictions,9 5 and to assure the tenant due process of law.96 The potential
for awards of punitive damages acts as a further deterrent.
Another rationale for the allowance of punitive damages under this
section is that the cause of action is really one in tort for which punitive
damages are available, and not in contract for which punitives are not
recoverable. 97 For instance, a self-help eviction action is similar to a
trespass action or breach of the peace98 while an action for seizure of
possessions is essentially a claim for conversion.
Similar to a lockout is the unauthorized seizure of a tenant's property
by the landlord. This is specifically prohibited by the Act.99 When the
landlord does seize property, he becomes a bailee and must use reason-
able care in the storage and preservation of the property. °00 However, a
landlord does not become a constructive bailee nor is he liable for
damaged property that is removed from rented premises and placed on
the landlord's property by a government official pursuant to a writ of
execution of a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action. 1° 1
The damages which may be awarded in regard to an illegal property
seizure are the same as in the case of a lockout.'0 2 Procedurally, the
tenant may pursue his claims through an offensive suit for the statutory
violation and for conversion or through a counterclaim in an eviction
s Scott v. Park Central Assoc., No. TG-CV-H-7676 (Cleve. Mun. Ct., Mar. 18, 1976).
9 See Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6, at 907-08.
9 Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372, 136 N.E. 145 (1922).
9 See, e.g., Edwards v. C.N. Inv. Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 57, 272 N.E.2d 652 (1971). The court
in Edwards carved out an exception to the common law rule permitting self-help evictions.
The exception was based on the fact that the landlord, by breaching the peace, violated a
public duty.
" OrIo REV. Conr ANN. § 5321.15(B) (Anderson 1981); see also Keener v. Ewert, 67 Ohio
App. 2d 17, 425 N.E.2d 914 (1979)(prohibits lockout of tenant).
1O Kayenda v. Kamenir, 16 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (1984). That decision concerned property
remaining in leased premises after the premises was closed because of flooding. The court
ruled that once the property was closed with the tenant's personal property inside, the
landlord became a bailee as to that property. The court held that the taking of possession by
the landlord satisfied the essential elements for creation of a bailment. The court further
held that absent the tenant's assent the landlord-bailee could not unilaterally exempt
himself from liability for negligence by posting a sign declaiming property "abandoned" if
left in the property after a certain date.
101 Ringler v. Sias, 68 Ohio App. 2d 230, 428 N.E.2d 869 (1980).
102 Melvin v. Bryant, No. 7259 (Montgomery County, Nov. 13, 1981)(court awarded
damages); Keener v. Ewert, 67 Ohio App. 2d 17, 425 N.E.2d 914 (1979)(court ordered return
of security deposit and rent paid).
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action.10 3 Once the claim is filed, a tenant must prove damages by evid-
ence of either a market value at the time of the seizure 0 4 or the purchase
price of the goods seized.' o5
Another impermissible act is the landlord's termination of utility
service to the residence.106 A court may also issue a restraining order to
enjoin violations of section 5321.15, including termination of utilities.107
The other type of landlord action to be discussed here is retaliation
against a tenant who has engaged in activities protected under the Act.10 8
The retaliation section has been the focus of much litigation, some of
which has weakened the protections supposedly provided to tenants. For
example, in Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Watkins, the
Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County stated that despite the anti-
retaliation section of the Act a landlord may bring a forcible entry and
detainer action when the tenant is in arrears in rental payments.10 9 The
Court cited Karas v. Floydilo for that proposition. However, the Watkins
court overstated the holding of Karas, which actually held that once a
tenant shows that the challenged action of the landlord was in response
to protected activity of the tenant, it becomes the landlord's duty to prove
that the challenged action was taken because the tenant was in default in
payment of rent, the code violation of which the tenant has complained is
attributable to the tenant, or repairs to the premises necessary for
compliance with applicable codes require the tenant to vacate or the
tenant is holding over."' While the statute does provide that "[n]ot-
withstanding" retaliatory conduct by the landlord, he may still bring an
eviction action for one of the four reasons listed above," 2 it does not
follow that if a landlord proves the existence of circumstances supporting
one or more of those reasons, the eviction should automatically be
103 Naumann v. Taylor, No. L-78-295 (Lucas County, July 6, 1979).
'o Woodard v. Walker, No. 78AP-495, slip op. at 349 (Franklin County, Feb. 27, 1979).
105 Russ v. Hill, No. E-78-26 (Erie County, Oct. 13, 1978). The use of the purchase price
is not conclusive as to the issue of damages. Rather, it is only an indication of the value of
the goods.
'o Fox v. Wilson, No. CA80-32 (Muskingum County, March 30, 1981)(citing Omo REV.
CoDE ANN. § 5321.15 (Anderson 1981)).
107 Colquett v. Byrd, 59 Ohio Misc. 45 (1979). In that case the municipal court deter-
mined it had jurisdiction to enjoin a utility shut-off and could do so without setting a bond.
' Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Anderson 1981). The tenant has a right to complain to
the landlord or an appropriate government agency about violations of building, housing,
health and safety codes or violations of a landlord's duties under R.C. § 5321.04. Further,
the tenant has the right to participate in the activities of a tenant association without
threat or action by a landlord in the form of rent increases, decreases in service or eviction
actions.
'09 23 Ohio App. 3d 20, 25, 491 N.E.2d 701 (1984).
110 2 Ohio App. 3d 4, 440 N.E.2d 563 (1981).
111 Id. at 6.
112 Oieo REVISED CODE ANN. § 5321.03(A) (Anderson 1981).
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granted. The landlord should be able to succeed only if, in the absence of
a retaliatory motive, the eviction action would have been filed.
There are a number of possible ways for a tenant to succeed on a
retaliation defense to an eviction even though the case fits into one of the
exceptions. For instance, if the landlord has caused the tenant to be in
violation in retaliation for the tenant's activities, then the landlord
should not be able to defeat the retaliation defense. Thus, when a tenant
was made a holdover by the landlord's serving a thirty-day notice upon
the tenant, evidence that would show that the notice was served after the
landlord learned of the tenant's activity in a tenant's association would
be relevant to establish a retaliatory motive and could lead to judgment
for the tenant.113 In such cases, the timing of the notice to the landlord of
the protected activities in relation to the notice to the tenant to vacate
would be a substantial factor.114
Another factor that would demonstrate that retaliation was the actual
motive would be if the tenant is being treated differently than other
tenants who have not engaged in the protected activity. Thus, a land-
lord's refusal to accept a late rental payment from a tenant who had
complained about conditions when the landlord regularly accepted such
113 Voyager Village Ltd. v. Williams, 3 Ohio App. 3d 288, 444 N.E.2d 1337 (1982).
Though that case involved a mobile home park tenancy and, therefore, applied the
retaliation sections of Chapter 3733, the court's reasoning on the second assignment of
error, dealing with the retaliation defense, is instructive since those sections were modeled
after Onto Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.02, 5321.03. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court was in error in holding that retaliation was not a valid defense to an eviction based
on a tenant holding over this term. The Court framed the issue as not whether a holdover
tenant can be evicted, but whether the law will label the tenant a holdover. 3 Ohio App. 3d
at 295. If the original 30-day notice issued to the tenant was prompted by the tenant's
exercise of protected rights, then the tenant can use the retaliatory action of the park
owner-landlord as a defense to the eviction, even though the eviction is premised on the
tenant's status as a "holdover." The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination
of whether the tenant had sustained his burden of proving retaliation.
114 Karas, 2 Ohio App. 3d at 6, 440 N.E.2d at 566. While the Karas court recognized the
potential importance of the timing factor, indicating that it could play a substantial role in
determining the landlord's motive, it also held that evidence of the temporal proximity of
the parties' actions does not create a presumption of retaliation. Accord Howard v. Simon,
18 Ohio App. 3d 14, 480 N.E.2d 99 (1984). Instead, the tenant must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the landlord's motive is retaliatory. Of course, the timing of the
landlord's action may be the most persuasive evidence. If the tenant succeeds in meeting
this burden, the burden shifts to the landlord to prove that the action was brought for a
different reason. Karas, 2 Ohio App. 3d at 6, 440 N.E.2d at 566.
Some other jurisdictions have a statutory presumption of retaliation if the landlord's
action is taken within a specified time of the tenant's protected activity. See, e.g., CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1942.5 (West 1985). This seems a sounder approach since otherwise the tenant must
attempt to show the state of mind of the landlord. See infra text setting forth Proposed
Amendments to the current statute.
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late payments from other tenants was held to demonstrate a retaliatory
motive.115
Another question that can arise is whether an eviction action should be
granted if retaliation is one of two or more reasons for the eviction. One
Ohio court of appeals has rejected the proposed standard that the tenant
needs to show by clear and convincing evidence that retaliation was the
motive for the landlord's action.11 6 One unreported Ohio decision has held
that even if otherwise legitimate reasons support the landlord's action, if
the action is taken in response to protected activity by the tenant, illegal
retaliation has occurred. 11 7 Thus, it would seem that Ohio courts should
look beyond the mere fact of nonpayment of rent, holdover tenancy, etc.,
to see whether a retaliatory motive played a part in the landlord's
decision.""
To provide recompense for tenant victims of retaliation both damages
and attorney fees are allowed under the Act, 119 and an injunction may be
issued to prohibit the landlord from carrying out threatened
retaliation. 2 0 Although attorney fees are available to a tenant who
prevails on a claim of retaliation, that right was severely limited by the
Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Jemo Assoc., Inc. v. Garman.121 In
Garman, the Court held that in order to recover attorney fees on a
counterclaim for retaliatory eviction, a tenant must prove actual dam-
ages. This is unfortunate because in many cases, actual damages may be
difficult to prove, such as when the tenant has only been threatened with
a retaliatory action. Thus, a tenant may find himself able to defeat an
eviction action on the grounds that it was brought in retaliation and not
11 Belvoir Cliffs Apts. v. Bembry, 56 Ohio Misc. 37, 383 N.E.2d 1170 (1978).
116 Karas v. Floyd, 2 Ohio App. 3d 4, 6, 440 N.E.2d 563, 566 (1981).
117 Gateway Apts. v. Darrah, Nos. 76-CVG-725, 76-CVG-928 (Lyndhurst Mun. Ct., Aug.
22, 1977). The court relied in part on precedent in the labor law area, in which claims of
retaliation for union activity are at issue. Courts have held that in such cases liability could
be found if only one reason for an employee's discharge was retaliation for union activity.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Whittier Mach. Works, 204 F.2d 883,885 (1st Cir. 1953). Similarly, courts
in fair housing cases have determined that even if only one of the motives for a challenged
action was based on prohibited criteria, illegal discrimination has taken place. See, e.g.,
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Smith
v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970).
115 Other jurisdictions vary greatly in their response to this question. Compare Silberg v.
Lipscomb, 117 N.J. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (1971)(liability for retaliation found if any part of
motive retaliatory) with Dickhut v. Norman, 45 Wisc. 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970)
(retaliation must be sole motive). It should be noted that the court in Karas v. Floyd, 2 Ohio
App. 3d 4, 440 N.E.2d 563 (1981), thus far the most thorough consideration of Ohio's
anti-retaliation provisions, considered and rejected the standard adopted in Dickhut and
determined it to be inappropriate under Ohio law.
"' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02(B) (Anderson 1981).
12 See, e.g., Creps v. Brandon, No. L-82-132 (Lucas County, Nov. 12, 1982).
121 70 Ohio St. 2d 267, 436 N.E.2d 1353 (1982).
19881
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
be able to be reimbursed for the expenses of defending against the
landlord's illegal act. Even worse, a tenant who is unable to afford an
attorney in such an action may not be able to get representation because
there is no certainty that counsel will be paid. 122 Since the purpose of the
landlord-tenant act is to protect tenants, decisions such as this have
undercut the law's intended purpose.
While certain of the foregoing decisions have robbed the retaliation
provision of some of its effectiveness, it can still provide protection for
tenants. It has been successfully argued that an eviction brought against
a tenant who did not provide the landlord with a passkey was
retaliatory.1 23 It has also been held that an eviction filed after complaints
to the health department was also retaliatory. 124
Certain changes should be made to the Act to better effectuate the aims
of the legislation in protecting tenants against impermissible acts by the
landlord, including actions taken in retaliation for protected activities.
First, a standard for damages should be established for violations of Ohio
Revised Code section 5321.15, so that the confusion as to whether or not
punitive damages are available would be eliminated. This has already
been provided in Ohio Revised Code section 5321.16, in which a violation
of security deposit provisions triggers a recovery of the full or partial
deposit plus an amount equal to the amount wrongfully withheld.125 A
suggested alternative for the harsher actions in the case of lockouts,
property seizures, utility termination or retaliation would be the treble
damages award and attorney fees like those found in the Ohio Consumer
Sales Practices Act. 126
A presumption of retaliation should be enacted into Ohio Revised Code
section 5321.02, so that prohibited actions as listed in the statute could
not be taken against a tenant within a specified period of time unless
there was another just cause of action. In this way, a cooling-off period
would be established to protect a tenant during the period immediately
following a complaint when a landlord is often angered at the tenant's
action.
12 See, e.g., Howard v. Simon, 18 Ohio App. 3d 14, 18, 480 N.E.2d 99 (1984)(citing Karas
v. Floyd, 2 Ohio App. 3d 4, 440 N.E.2d 563 (1981). Because a defense of retaliation
necessarily involves a question of motive, such a case is generally not one that a tenant will
be able to successfully litigate per se. For the same reason, such a case will probably demand
more time and effort than most eviction cases making it even more difficult to find an
attorney willing to undertake the substantial risk of non-payment.
123 Spencer v. Blackmon, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 52 (1985).
124 Karas v. Floyd, 2 Ohio App. 3d 4, 440 N.E. 2d 563 (1980).
125 But see infra text accompanying notes 333-90 which discusses problems with this
provision.
121 Otuo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.09 (Anderson 1978).
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D. Tenant Duties
The initial duty of any tenant is to pay in a timely fashion the rent
agreed upon for his use of the premises. This duty was apparently so clear
that the General Assembly did not codify this obligation, although the
Act contains a number of references to the duty to pay rent. 27
Other duties of tenants were not so obvious. Thus, the legislature
enumerated seven specific obligations for tenants relating to the protec-
tion of the landlord's property.12 Many of these obligations complement
the responsibilities imposed on the landlord. 129
While the Act requires the tenant to dispose of rubbish in a safe
manner, 130 keep plumbing fixtures as clean as their condition permits' 3 1
and keep the premises in a safe and sanitary condition, 132 it does not
require tenants to make repairs. In fact, the only parts of the Act using the
word "repair" impose this duty on the landlord. 33 The other important
statutory duty of the tenant is to permit access to the landlord or his
agent to the premises upon reasonable notice.' 34 Reasonable notice has
been defined by the Act to require the landlord to give a twenty-four hour
notice to his tenant of the intention to enter the premises, except for
emergencies.135
Another obligation of the tenant codifies the established common law
duty of a tenant not to commit waste. 136 The Act expands this obligation
to forbid any person who is on the landlord's premises with the permis-
sion of the tenant from causing damage to the landlord's property, either
intentionally or negligently. 137 A tenant is not liable for all negligent acts
127 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1923.02(B), 5321.02(C), 5321.07(B) (Anderson 1981).
128 Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05 (A)(1)-(7) (Anderson 1981).
129 Compare Ono REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05 (Anderson 1981) with OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5321.04 (Anderson 1981). See also Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6, at 897-99; Baillis, supra
note 2, at 133-34.
120 Oo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A)(2) (Anderson 1981).
11OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A)(3) (Anderson 1981).
22 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A)(1) (Anderson 1981).
123 Oio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04(A)(2), 5321.05(B)(11) (Anderson 1981). One possible
exception to this lack of a duty to repair involves Revised Code section 5321.05(A)(7) which
states: "A tenant who is a party to a rental agreement shall: Maintain in good working order
and condition any range, refrigerator, washer, dryer, dishwasher, or other appliances
supplied by the landlord and required to be maintained by the tenant under the terms and
conditions of a written rental agreement." Owo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A)(7) (Anderson
1981). The foregoing could conceivably be read to allow a landlord under a lease to require
repairs to appliances to be made by the tenant.
134 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(B) (Anderson 1981).
1 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A)(8) (Anderson 1981). In addition, entry also must be
made at reasonable times of the day. This is to prevent a landlord from abusing his right of
entry or using it as a means to retaliate against his tenant.
138 Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6, at 898.
137 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A)(6) (Anderson 1981) provides: "(A) A tenant who is a
1988]
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
of guests which cause damage to the rental premises.3S Thus, in a suit
brought by a landlord's insurance company exercising subrogation rights
against a tenant whose visiting daughter had negligently caused a fire
which destroyed the premises, the court found that the Act did not impose
a duty upon a tenant actually to prevent negligent acts of third parties.1 39
Only if a tenant was aware of a guest's negligent acts and failed to
command the person to discontinue the negligent acts, could the tenant
be held to have violated this duty. 40 Thus, the statute does not establish
a strict liability standard against tenants for damages caused by the
negligence of their guests.14 1
In recognition of the unequal bargaining position of the parties, the
General Assembly prohibited any waiver of the landlord's obligations. 42
However, the Act specifically permits the landlord to undertake any of
the tenant's duties based on an agreement of the parties. 143
However, there has been little opportunity for interpretation of a
tenant's obligations under the Act. This is not surprising since the
drafters spent considerable time in enumerating the duties of a tenant.'"
There have, however, been several areas of considerable controversy
regarding rental payments. The first relates to late payment of rent by
the tenant. Under Ohio common law, courts have recognized that when
there has been a pattern of rental payments made later than the dates
prescribed in the lease, the landlord has waived the right to evict based
on receipt of late rent. 145 Courts have permitted the landlord to evict upon
party to a rental agreement shall: (6) Personally refrain, and forbid any other person who
is on the premises with his permission, from intentionally or negligently destroying,
defacing, damaging, or removing any fixture, appliance, or other part of the premises."
"I Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Wills, 29 Ohio App. 3d 219, 504 N.E.2d 1164 (1985).
139 Id. at 220, 504 N.E.2d at 1167.
140 Id. at 221-22, 504 N.E.2d at 1167-68.
141 Id. at 221, 504 N.E.2d at 1168. In its decision, the court first discussed the principles
of statutory construction established by the General Assembly. The court concluded that the
Act must be construed to achieve a reasonable balance between the legitimate rights of both
landlords and tenants.
142 Oaio REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(E) (Anderson 1981).
143 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(F) (Anderson 1981). "The landlord may agree to
assume responsibility for fulfilling any duty or obligation imposed on a tenant by § 5321.05
of the Revised Code." Id.
144 These specific enumerations, along with the provisions voiding any landlord-imposed
duties inconsistent with the Act, limit the opportunity for misunderstandings about the
meaning of the Statute, The appropriate rule of statutory construction in this situation is
expressio unius est exclusion alterius, literally meaning, the "expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another" BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 692 (5th ed. 1979). See also Oio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1.51 (Anderson 1981).
14 Finkbeiner v. Lutz, 44 Ohio App. 2d 223, 337 N.E.2d 655 (1975); Lauch v. Monning,
15 Ohio App. 2d 112, 239 N.E.2d 675 (1968); Bates & Springer, Inc. v. Nay, 91 Ohio L. Abs.
425, 187 N.E.2d 415 (1963).
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a showing that advance notice of a discontinuation of the practice of
accepting late payments had been given to the tenant. 146
A serious judicial undercutting of the reforms intended by the legisla-
ture is found in the treatment by the courts of the Act's statutory set-off
provision which exhibits a clear intention by the General Assembly to
protect a tenant refusing to pay rent because of a landlord's failure to
provide a fit and habitable dwelling. The provision in question, Ohio
Revised Code section 1923.061,147 provides that in an action for eviction,
the tenant may counterclaim for any amount due under the rental
agreement or the Act. Thus, a counterclaim could be asserted by the
tenant for the landlord's failure to fulfill his statutory obligations. If it is
shown at trial that the amount owed by the tenant for rent is exceeded by
the amount due the tenant as a result of the counterclaim, judgment on
the claim for possession should be rendered in favor of the tenant. The
commentators on the Act were unanimous in their prediction that this
part of the law established a new defense to an eviction action. 148 This
defense was based both on the plain meaning of the Act and the common
law principle of "mutually dependent convenants."'149 The latter concept
recognizes that the duty to pay rent is dependent on the landlord's
compliance with his obligations under the Act. 150
146 The decisions are not uniform on the amount of advance notice required. See, e.g.,
Classic Real Estate v. Bowen, No. M-79-CVG-01404 (Franklin County, Mar. 12,
1979)(Section 5321.17 notice period or time specified in the lease); Lauch, 15 Ohio App. 2d
at 113 (three days). Arguably, with the passage of the Act the longer period in section
5321.17 should apply rather than the three day period. Bates & Springer, Inc., 91 Ohio L.
Abs. at 425. Only the Eighth District has addressed the issue of whether the notice must be
in writing. As a general rule, that court requires written notice. Id. It has, however,
permitted oral notice where the tenant admits to having recieved it. Associated Estates
Corp. v. Smith, No. 46054 (Cuyahoga County, Oct. 4, 1984).
147 OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 1923.061(B)(Anderson 1981):
In an action for possession of residential premises based upon nonpayment of
the rent or in an action for rent when the tenant is in possession, the tenant may
counterclaim for any amount he may recover under the rental agreement or under
§ 3733. or § 5321. of the Revised Code. In that event the court from time to time
may order the tenant to pay into court all or part of the past due rent and rent
becoming due during the pendency of the action. After trial and judgment, the
party to whom a net judgment is owed shall be paid first from the money paid into
court, and any balance shall be satisfied as any other judgment. If no rent remains
due after application of this division, judgment shall be entered for the tenant in
the action for possession. If the tenant has paid into court an amount greater than
that necessary to satisify a judgment obtained by the landlord, the balance shall
be returned by the court to the tenant.
145 Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6, at 923-27; Baillis, supra note 2, at 140-41.
9 Leleme v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969). See also Note,
Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24, 25 (1970).
"' See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831, 842
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Unfortunately, the judicial interpretation of this section of the law has
substantially defeated the purpose of this provision. The leading case is
Smith v. Wright,151 where a landlord had brought an eviction action based
on nonpayment of rent and the tenant filed counterclaims based on severe
pest infestation of the premises. The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals
held that in an action for forcible entry and detainer, the unfit condition
of the rented premises "can be in issue only if the tenant is current in
rental payments, having paid them either directly to the landlord or
having deposited them into court."1 52 Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court had properly excluded evidence of the unfit condition
of the premises in an eviction proceeding where the tenant was admit-
tedly in default in rental payments and had not deposited his rent into
court.
The Smith decision and others that have followed it15s have the
practical effect of rendering impotent a part of the Act enacted to protect
tenants. These decisions are inconsistent with the plain meaning of
section 1923.061(B). Under this precedent, section 1923.061(B) provides
the court discretionary authority to order rent paid into court and accords
the tenant a set-off defense in the exercise of that discretion. Yet, there is
simply no basis in section 1923.061(B), or in any other section of Chapter
1923 or Chapter 5321, or in the theory of implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, to support such a position.
The authors submit that the Smith court misread section 1923.061. The
court held that the provision therein mandating that judgment shall be
rendered for the tenant if after trial it is determined he owes no rent, only
comes into play if the court has ordered rent paid into court.1 54 The key
sentence is: "if no rent remains due after application of this division,
judgment shall be entered for the tenant in the action for possession." The
Smith court apparently felt that "application of this division" referred to
the payment of rent into the court and that if such payment was not made
the section had not been applied, and the legislative command that
judgment should be rendered for the tenant was inapplicable.
However, this reasoning results from a fundamental misreading of the
statute. "Application of this division" should be read to mean that which
(1973); Note, Landlords and Tenants-Forcible Entry and Detainer-Eviction Action for
Nonpayment of Rent-Defenses: Smith v: Wright, 8 N. Ky. L. Rev. 423, 431-32 (1981).
"' 65 Ohio App. 2d 101; 416 N.E.2d 655 (1979).
152 Id. at 109, 416 N.E.2d at 661.
... Martins Ferry Jaycee Hous., Inc. v. Pawlaczyk, 4 Ohio App. 3d 302, 448 N.E.2d 512
(1982). The Belmont County Court of Appeals followed Smith and ruled that the section
1923.061(B) set-off defense is available only if the tenant has deposited the unpaid contract
rent with the court, either voluntarily pursuant to section 5321.07 or by court order
pursuant to section 1923.061(B). See also Geyer v. Frank, No. CA84-06-074 (Butler County,
Jan. 14, 1986)(dicta).
154 Smith, 65 Ohio App. 2d at 107.
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is the primary thrust of the section, namely the assertion of counter-
claims by the tenant, not the order by the court for payment of rent into
the court. The payment of rent into the court is merely an optional
method of guaranteeing the money that could potentially be due the
landlord. It is not the major focus of the statute. Whether or not the rental
money is paid into court, the court should decide the claims and
counterclaims. If the judgment on the counterclaim is for the tenant in an
amount that exceeds the amount of the rent owed, the tenant should be
granted judgment on the claim for possession.
The Smith Court misinterpreted the discretion granted to the court by
the Act to order deposit of rent during the pendency of the action. That
part of the statute was designed to protect a landlord whose ability to
collect rent due after a long pretrial delay might be endangered. The
discretion is to be exercised to that end alone. The exercise or non-
exercise of that discretion should not be determinative of whether the
tenant can prevail in the eviction action if the evidence shows that,
because the tenant is owed more on his counterclaims than he owes the
landlord for rent, in effect no rent is owed. Whether a tenant can avail
himself of such a method of defeating an eviction action cannot be
dependent on the discretion of a court. 
4a
Such was not the intent of the legislature in adopting this key section
of the Act. Ohio Revised Code Section 1923.061(B) was taken from the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act section 4.105 [hereinafter cited as
URLTA]. 155 Interestingly, that section of the URLTA is entitled "Land-
154a It should be pointed out that under the interpretation of the Smith court, the landlord's
right to possession also depends on the discretion of the court as to what is essentially a
procedural matter. For instance, in Sandefur Mgmt. Co. v. Smith, 21 Ohio App. 3d 145, 486
N.E.2d 1234 (1985), it was held that because the court had exercised its discretion and ordered
rent deposited into court and the net judgment for the landlord was less than the amount thus
deposited, the tenant was entitled to possession. The tenant in that case recovered on her
counterclaim, but in an amount less than the amount of rent owed at the time the action was
filed. Thus, though the tenant owed money for rent, the landlord's claim for possession was
defeated, since more money was deposited than was owed.
155 UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT AcT, supra note 47, § 4.105. The explanation about
this section from the drafters of the language of section 1923.061 does not indicate that the
availability of the habitability defense depends on the discretion of the court:
Article II defines the obligations of the landlord which the tenant may enforce
against him (Section 1.105). While Lindsey v. Normet (405 U.S. 56) holds no
principle of constitutional law requires the admission of the habitability defense
in a summary proceeding maintained by the landlord against the tenant, Section
4.105 is consistent with modern procedural reform in permitting the tenant to file
a counterclaim or other appropriate pleading in the summary proceeding to the
end that all issues between the parties may be disposed of in one proceeding. It is
anticipated that upon filing of the counterclaim the court will enter the order
deemed appropriate by him concerning the payment of the rent in order to protect
the interests of the parties. See cases in comment to Section 2.104(e).
1988]
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
lord's Non-Compliance as Defense to Action for Possession or Rent." It
seems clear that the legislature was bringing Ohio into line with modern
theories of the landlord-tenant relationship by allowing tenants the right
to contest evictions by showing that the landlord has failed to fulfill his
obligations.
Additional support for the theory that the legislature made provisions
for the availability to the tenant of a defense based on the warranty of
habitability is found in Ohio Revised Code section 1923.061(A),156 which
states that a tenant may assert any defense in an eviction action, and
section 5321.12,157 which holds that in an action under the Act a party
can recover for the breach of contract or other duty imposed by law. Thus,
the legislature recognized that a rental agreement is a contract, a breach
of which gives rise to remedies. Since, in an ordinary action on a contract,
the party sued for non-payment can assert as a defense the non-
performance by the other party, it would follow that a tenant sued for
non-payment can, in light of section 1923.061(A), raise as a defense the
non-performance by the landlord of his statutory duties. It is unthinkable
that the availability of the valid affirmative defense of non-performance
by one party to the contract would depend totally on the discretion of the
court as to whether or not to act as the escrow agent for the landlord. By
this reasoning, the tenant can be denied a substantive defense at the
option of the court. Not only does this result elevate a matter of court
procedure above a matter of substantive law, but it may constitute a
denial of due process.158
The defense of non-habitability has been denied to substantial numbers
of tenants by the Ohio courts' narrow interpretation. Unless the Ohio
Supreme Court is presented with an opportunity to reverse Smith and its
progeny, the only other course would be legislative action to overrule this
restrictive interpretation. While it seems that the Act as currently
worded already provides for the mutuality of obligations defense, in light
of the judicial interpretation, even clearer language may be required. The
possible solution is the enactment of a specific provision recognizing the
mutality of covenants as was proposed in one model law.15s
156 Omo Rgv. CODE ANN. § 1923.061(A) (Anderson 1981).
... Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Anderson 1981).
158 A property interest such as the tenant's leasehold, once created by the state, may not
be terminated without due process of law. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
433 (1982). To deny a tenant the right to present evidence in an eviction action pertaining
to the defense of non-performance by the landlord of statutory obligations would be to deny
the tenant due process of law since such defense has been permitted both by statute and by
the common law of contract.
159 MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-102 (Tent. Draft 1969).
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E. Landlord Remedies
Any discussion of remedies available to a landlord must begin with his
ability to recover the premises through a forcible entry and detainer
action commonly referred to as an eviction. eo If the landlord is successful
in the eviction action, a writ of restitution will be issued16 1 and will be
enforced by a sheriff, bailiff, or constable. 162 The enforcement consists of
putting the tenant and his or her possessions out of the premises, thus
restoring the premises to the landlord. Because of the obviously devas-
tating effect such a procedure can have for a tenant, an eviction should
not be granted without a full and fair opportunity for the tenant to be
heard.
Three provisions of Ohio Revised Code Chapter 5321 discuss eviction
actions. 163 While other sections of the Act do not specifically refer to
1"0 Ouio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1923.01 to 1923.15 (Anderson 1981)(govern actions for forcible
entry and detainer).
161 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.13 (Anderson 1981).
162 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.14 (Anderson 1981).
163 Section 5321.03 [Actions by landlords authorized.]
(A) Notwithstanding section 5321.02 of the Revised Code, a landlord may bring
an action under Chapter 1923 of the Revised Code for possession of the premises
if.
(1) The tenant is in default in the payment of rent;
(2) The violation of the applicable building, housing, health, or safety code that
the tenant complained of was primarily caused by any act or lack of reasonable
care by the tenant, or by any other person in the tenant's household, or by anyone
on the premises with the consent of the tenant;
(3) Compliance with the applicable building, housing, health, or safety code
would require alteration, remodeling, or demolition of the premises which would
effectively deprive the tenant of the use of the dwelling unit;
(4) A tenant is holding over his term.
(B) The maintenance of an action by the landlord under this section does not
prevent the tenant from recovering damages for any violation by the landlord of
the rental agreement or of section 5321.04 of the Revised Code.
Omo REVISED CODE ANN. § 5321.03 (Anderson 1981).
5321.05 [Obligations of tenant]
(C) If the tenant violates any provision of this section, the landlord may recover
any actual damages which result from the violation together with reasonable
attorneys fees. This remedy is in addition to any right of the landlord to terminate
the rental agreement, to maintain an action for the possession of the premises, or
injunctive relief to compel access under division (B) of this section.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05 (Anderson 1981).
§ 5321.15 [Residential premises landlord restrictions.]
(A) No landlord of residential premises shall initiate any act, including
termination of utilities or services, exclusion from the premises, or threat of any
unlawful act, against a tenant, or a tenant whose right to possession has
terminated, for the purpose of recovering possession of residential premises, other
than as provided in Chapters 1923, 5303, and 5321 of the Revised Code.
(B) No landlord of residential premises shall seize the furnishings or possessions
1988]
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actions for possession, some sections do discuss termination of rental
agreements. Section 5321.11 sets forth procedures for terminating the
rental agreement if the tenant has violated statutory duties imposed by
section 5321.05 that materially affect health and safety.164 The landlord
is to serve a notice of the specific violations on the tenant. The tenant
then has thirty days to correct the violation.6 5 The Act is clear that the
tenant may prevent a termination of the rental agreement and thus
defeat an action for possession by remedying violations imposed by
section 5321.05 within thirty days of a notice.166
The Act also specifies procedures for terminating periodic tenancies.
Either the landlord or the tenant may terminate such a tenancy by giving
notice one rental period in advance. 67 If a tenant who has been given
such a notice does not vacate upon the specified date, he becomes a
holdover tenant subject to eviction. 168
A tenant who has breached the terms of a written rental agreement,
but not any statutory obligations that materially affect health and safety,
of a tenant, or of a tenant whose right to possession has terminated, for the
purpose of recovering rent payments, other than in accordance with an order
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(C) A landlord who violates this section is liable in a civil action for all damages
caused to a tenant, or to a tenant whose right to possession has terminated,
together with reasonable attorneys fees.
OHIo REV. CoDE ANN. § 5321.15 (Anderson 1981).
164 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.11 (Anderson 1981); See supra text accompanying notes
127-55.
165 Omo REVISED CODE ANN. § 5321.11 (Anderson 1981):
[Noncompliance by tenant terminates agreement.] If the tenant fails to fulfill any
obligation imposed upon him by section 5321.05 of the Revised Code that
materially affects health and safety, the landlord may deliver a written notice of
this fact to the tenant specifying the act and omission that constitutes noncom-
pliance with such provisions and that the rental agreement will terminate upon
a date specified therein not less than thirty days after receipt of the notice. If the
tenant fails to remedy the condition contained in the notice, the rental agreement
shall than terminate as provided in the notice.
l Sandefur Mgmt. Co. v. Wilson, 21 Ohio App. 3d 160, 486 N.E.2d 1267 (1985); Parker
v. Fisher, 17 Ohio App. 3d 103, 477 N.E.2d 654 (1984); Yutzy v. Huebner, 14 Ohio Op. 3d
440 (1979).
117 Oao REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.17 (Anderson 1981):
[Termination of periodic tenancies.] (A) The landlord or the tenant may terminate
or fail to renew a week-to-week tenancy by notice given the other at least seven
days prior to the termination date specified in the notice. (B) The landlord or the
tenant may terminate or fail to renew a month-to-month tenacy by notice given
the other at least thirty days prior to the periodic rental date. (C) This section does
not apply to a termination based on the breach of a condition of the rental
agreement or the breach of a duty and obligation imposed by law.
s Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.02(A)(1) (Anderson 1981). The term "holding over" would
also refer to a tenant whose written lease has expired and who has been informed by the
landlord that he wishes the tenant to vacate.
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would be subject to termination of the rental agreement without the
thirty-day opportunity to cure unless the terms of the rental agreement
hold otherwise. 6 9 However, if the breach of the written rental agreement
is also a breach of statutory obligations, the landlord must comply with
the thirty-day notice-to-cure procedure of Section 5321.11.170
The notice requirements imposed by the forcible entry and detainer
statute' 71 must be met to confer jurisdiction on the court to hear the
action for possession.172 Even if the required notice has been served, the
landlord's acceptance of current or future rents waives the notice and, as
such, is a defense to an eviction action.'"v The waiver will not apply to
acceptance of earned rentals174 or partial payment in the form of federal
housing assistance. 175 The courts are split on whether or not the election
by the landlord to evict the tenant relieves the tenant of future obliga-
tions to pay rent.17 6 Where the landlord refuses a rent payment he cannot
base an eviction on the lessee's failure to pay rent.177
The requirement to refuse tender of future rents may cause a landlord
some hardship if there is any appreciable delay in hearing the forcible
entry and detainer action. 178 The delay may be occasioned by a motion by
either side for a continuance. A tenant might seek a continuance in order
to exercise the right to raise any defenses he may have to the landlord's
.. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.02(A)(9) (Anderson 1981). Parker, 17 Ohio App. 3d 103,
477 N.E.2d 654.
170 SandefurMgmt. Co., 21 Ohio App. 3d 160; Parker, 17 Ohio App.3d 103; Yutzy, 14 Ohio
Op. 3d 440.
171 Owuo REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.04 (Anderson 1981).
172 Siegler v. Batdorff, 63 Ohio App. 2d 76, 408 N.E.2d 1383 (1979); Yutzy v. Heubner, 14
Ohio Op. 3d 440 (1979).
173 Andrews School v. Brown, No. 11-040 (Lake County, March 14, 1986)(court held
landlord waived 3-day notice where tenant had no notice that rent received and held was
not accepted as timely payment of rent); Associated Estates Corp. v. Bartell, 24 Ohio App.
3d 6, 492 N.E.2d 841 (1985)(notice to vacate held waived when landlord's bank cashed rent
checks, despite landlord's later tender of money back to tenant); Graham v. Pavarin, 9 Ohio
App. 3d 89, 458 N.E.2d 421 (1983); Marchioni v. Wilson, 20 Ohio Misc. 2d 10, 485 N.E.2d
1073 (1984)(judgment granting writ vacated when, after hearing, landlord received and
cashed rent check); Presidential Park Apts. v. Colston, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 220 (1980).
174 Cubbon v. Locker, 5 Ohio App. 3d 200, 450 N.E.2d 697 (1982).
171 National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships v. Chapman, 18 Ohio App. 3d 104,481 N.E.2d
654 (1984).
176 Compare Cubbon, 5 Ohio App. 3d 200 (notice to vacate held to be election by landlord
to forfeit lease releasing tenant of any future obligations thereunder) with Briggs v.
McSwain, 31 Ohio App. 3d 85, 508 N.E.2d 1028 (1986)(notice to vacate does not terminate
tenant's obligation to pay rent for remainder of term or until new tenant secured).
177 Professional Inv. of Am., Inc. v. Ross, No. 44540 (Cuyahoga County, Dec. 9, 1982);
Caringi v. 2819 Harvard, Inc., No. 42834 (Cuyahoga County, Mar. 12, 1981).
178 Presidential Park Apt. v. Colston, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 220, 221 (1980).
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claim as well as any counterclaims.179 At least one court has held a
tenant's claims for damages arising from a tenancy to be compulsory
counterclaims to a pending forcible entry and detainer action. 180 A
landlord might seek a continuance for, among other reasons, time to
respond to a tenant's counterclaims. A delay may also be occasioned by a
demand by either party for a trial by jury. If a jury demand is made, the
action is to proceed as any other civil case.""1 Thus, the proceeding will
not be summary in nature.
Because of the possibility of such a delay, the law makes provision for
protection of the landlord's ability to collect rent that becomes due during
the pendency of the action. A tenant seeking a continuance of more than
eight days is required to provide a bond to assure payment of rent that
might accrue.' 8 2
Because the bond required is for the purpose of securing the rent
payments until the conclusion of the eviction proceedings, it should be
sufficient for the tenant to be ordered to pay rent into the court as it
becomes due. This sort of "use-and-occupancy bond" serves the purpose of
securing the landlord's right to obtain rent for the months prior to a
determination on the forcible entry and detainer claim and does not
unfairly deny a tenant the time necessary to present his defenses and
counterclaims. Requiring a bond in a large amount will in most cases
deny the tenant a continuance that most litigants are granted as a matter
of course. 183 Few tenants will have the sort of resources necessary to
obtain a surety bond in a large amount. Thus, setting a bond in an
amount greatly exceeding a month's rent is, in effect, a procedural ruling
made on the basis of the financial resources of the tenant.
Obviously, the legislature intended that the landlord's position should
not be permitted to deteriorate during the pendency of an eviction action.
It sought to prevent tenants from using the court system to live rent-free
by the use of delaying tactics.' 8 4 However, it is also clear that the
179 Jemo Assoc., Inc. v. Garman, 70 Ohio St. 2d 267, 436 N.E.2d 1353 (1985); OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Anderson 1981).
18o Maduka v. Parries, 14 Ohio App. 3d 191, 470 N.E.2d 464 (1984).
181 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.10 (Anderson 1981).
182 no REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.08 (Anderson 1981). As long as the tenant gives the
required bond, he may be entitled to the continuance. Seventh Urban, Inc. v. University
Circle Property Dev., Inc., 67 Ohio St. 2d 19, 30,423 N.E.2d 1070 (1981): "In order to secure
the continuance.. . appellant need only to have given the required bond."
"83 See, e.g., Vesta Suites v. Primes, No. CV-G-1652 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct., Nov. 12, 1986).
There the court granted a continuance of a little more than a month but directed the
defendant-tenant to give bond in the amount of $2,000. Since the monthly rent was only
$200, the bond was almost ten times the amount necessary to secure payment of rent likely
to accrue.
184 Thus, it is only when the tenant seeks the continuance that the bond is required.
Talbot v. Resler, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 461, 113 N.E.2d 21 (1952).
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legislature intended that tenants be able to assert whatever defenses and
counterclaims they might have.185 One indication that the legislature
considered payment of rent into the court as it becomes due to be
adequate protection for the landlord is that it provided for just such a
procedure in a section of Chapter 1923 that was part of the Act. When the
tenant files a counterclaim in an action for possession based on non-
payment of rent or in an action for rent when the tenant is still in
possession, the court may from time to time order rent to be paid into
court.'8 6 This sort of use-and-occupancy bond should adequately protect
the landlord's interest.
Damages are also available to a landlord for breaches of a tenant's
duties under the Act.'8 7 The statutory damages are limited to actual
damages incurred as a foreseeable consequence of the breach.
The landlord must introduce competent evidence of actual damages.'8 8
Opinions of witnesses are not of themselves sufficient to prove actual
damages.' 8 9 Thus, when a landlord's evidence is solely his opinion of the
cost to relet an apartment or clean it the law does not permit recovery. 190
Another issue regarding proof of damage is whether a landlord must
mitigate any loss incurred as a result of a tenant's breach of obligations.
The modern rule recognizes that a landlord must mitigate damages. 191
The Act provides an additional remedy when the tenant refuses to give
's Jemo Assoc., Inc. v. Garman, 70 Ohio St. 2d 267, 436 N.E.2d 1353 (1985).
SOs0o REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Anderson 1981). See supra text accompanying notes
147-58.
' Oro REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(C) (Anderson 1981). If damages are awarded the Court
may award attorney fees to the landlord. Landlord-Tenant, supra note 12, at 909.
l Groves v. Freedom Oil Works Co., 60 Ohio App. 376, 21 N.E.2d 599 (1938).
i Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Stephens, 75 Ohio St. 171, 79 N.E. 235 (1906); Mentor
Lagoons, Inc. v. Geldart, No. 6-265 (Lake County, Jan. 29, 1979); Stern v. Taft, 49 Ohio App.
2d 405, 361 N.E.2d 279 (1976); Shaker Building Co. v. Fed. Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc.
246 (1971).
"9 Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Drizigacker, No. 8-247, slip op. at 4-5 (Lake County, June 18,
1982).
In the instant cause, appellant, in the form of testimony by Albert C. Nozik, who
admitted he was in reality plaintiff, did not set forth facts upon which he based his
opinions as to the cost of cleaning up and redecorating the subject apartment. He
admitted his figures were estimates. As to a broker's commission or re-rental fee,
there was no evidence offered that such a fee has in fact been paid or was owed by
appellee and, therefore, appellee had not been damaged in the amount of $208.50
for the re-rental of said apartment. We conclude appellee failed to offer sufficient
evidence as to any damages suffered by it for redecorating, cleaning up the
apartment and re-rental fees.
s Stern, 49 Ohio App. 2d 405. While courts may recognize the duty to mitigate, the
reasonableness of the landlord's efforts at mitigation is a question of fact. See, e.g., Mentor
Lagoons, Inc. v. Geldart, Case No. 6-265 (Lake County, Jan. 29, 1979), where the court
upheld the trial court's determination that a period of two months to clean the apartment
and four months to re-let was not an abuse of discretion.
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the landlord reasonable access to the premises. Under the Act the
landlord may apply to the courts for an injunction ordering the tenant to
comply with his statutory duty.192
In light of the strong bargaining position of the landlord the remedies
available by the Act are sufficient to protect his interest. However, there
are two legislative changes which should be enacted. First, the law
should codify the requirement that a landlord must mitigate any dam-
ages resulting from a tenant's breach. URLTA has a provision which
recognizes this principle.193
The other change involves the type of bond required of a tenant to
obtain a continuance of a forcible entry and detainer action.19 4 The
potential for setting an unreasonably high bond exists under the present
statute. In order to avoid this possibility but still protect the landlord's
interest, the Act should be modified to limit the amount of the bond to the
amount of rent claimed to be due and owing as of the filing of the action
and to require the tenant to deposit rent with the Court in a timely
fashion until the completion of the proceedings.
F. Tenant Remedies
The Landlord-Tenant Act provided tenants with a number of remedies
that did not exist under common law. First, the Act provided a means to
enforce the right to a fit and habitable dwelling place. 195 In addition, the
Act provided a means for the tenant to combat retaliatory and self-help
actions by landlords. 196 The statute is not the sole source of remedies for
tenants, however, as the Supreme Court of Ohio has decided. 197 Causes of
action in tort and contract may also be brought by tenants, as well as
claims based on other statutes. 9 8
1. Remedies Under Chapter 5321
a. Remedy for Illegal Entry
As discussed above, Ohio Revised Code section 5321.04 of the Landlord
Tenant Act sets forth the obligations of the landlord concerning mainte-
nance and repairs. With one exception, however, that section of the Act
192 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(C) (Anderson 1981).
' Un . RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT Acr, supra note 47, § 4.203(C), at 26. That section
requires the landlord to make reasonable efforts to relet the premises. Failure to use
reasonable efforts results in termination of the lease as of the date the landlord became
aware of the tenant's breach.
194 OImo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.081 (Anderson 1981).
'95 Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Anderson 1981).
1 Otno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.02, 5321.15 (Anderson 1981).
197 Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 25, 427 N.E.2d 774, 777 (1981).
198 Id.
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does not specify the remedies available to the tenant when the landlord
fails to fulfill those statutory obligations. For such remedies the tenant
must look to other parts of the Act and to common law remedies.
The one exception concerns landlord abuse of the right of entry.199 One
of the obligations of the landlord is to give reasonable notice of the intent
to enter and to enter only at reasonable times. 200 Except when special
circumstances are shown to exist, twenty-four hours is deemed to be
reasonable notice. 20 ' If the landlord enters the unit without giving
sufficient notice or harasses the tenant by making repeated demands for
entry that would, in isolation, be lawful, the statute provides that the
landlord can be held liable for actual damages and attorney fees. 20 2 The
tenant can also obtain an injunction or can terminate the rental
agreement. 20 3
This particular section of the Act, when read in conjunction with the
section admonishing tenants not to unreasonably deny access to a
landlord entering for a legitimate purpose, rather specifically delineates
the rights and obligations of the parties concerning access of the landlord
to the apartment. The landlord has no right to enter except for specific
purposes, and then only after providing reasonable notice; only in the
case of a bona fide emergency can a landlord demand immediate access.
Thus, it has been held that a landlord has no right to a passkey. 20 4
What constitutes a "reasonable notice" and "reasonable times" and
"unreasonable manner" of entry is, of course, a matter of interpreta-
tion.203 So is the question of whether repeated demands for entry have the
effect of harassing the tenant.
As opposed to the section of the Act setting forth the tenant's obliga-
tions which provides for recovery by the landlord of actual damages for
violation of any of the tenants' duties, section 5321.04 does not provide for
recovery for any violation by the landlord except that regarding entry.
'9 Pursuant to Revised Code section 5321.05(B) the tenant must allow the landlord
entry for specific purposes. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(B) (Anderson 1981).
200 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A)(8) (Anderson 1981).
201 Id.
202 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(B) (Anderson 1981).
203 id.
204 Spencer v. Blackmon, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 52, 490 N.E.2d 943 (1985). In this case it was
held that since a landlord had no right to have a passkey, the attempt by the landlord to
evict the tenant for failing to provide the landlord a passkey constituted retaliation as a
matter of law.
205 For instance, can a landlord demand entry during the hours that a tenant normally
works? It may depend on the circumstances of the particular request. If the reason for the
entry is to allow a plumber in to do necessary repairs, and the plumber only works during
these hours, the demand might be reasonable. If, however, the landlord's purpose is to
inspect the premises, since in most cases this could be done at a time more convenient to the
tenant, an entry made while the tenant is at work may be unreasonable.
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The tenant must look elsewhere for a remedy for violations of the
landlord's statutory obligations.
b. Rent Depositing
The Act provides a unique avenue for tenants faced with the refusal of
a landlord to fulfill statutory obligations. The statutory scheme permits
the tenants to use the threat of temporarily withholding rental payments
as a means to secure compliance by the landlord with the statutory
obligations.20 6
The rent deposit remedy is available whenever a landlord has failed to
fulfill obligations imposed by the Act or by the rental agreement; or,
because of the condition of the premises, the tenant reasonably believes
the landlord has so failed to fulfill these obligations, or the landlord has
been cited for non-compliance with local building, housing, health or
safety codes which apply to conditions materially affecting health and
safety. 20 7 Obviously, there will be some overlap in the above. For
instance, a citation by the local housing inspector would be evidence of a
violation of the landlord's statutory duties since compliance with appli-
cable codes is one of the statutory obligations of the landlord2 0 8 and would
certainly give the tenant reason to believe that a violation has occurred.
It should also be stressed that a violation of the rental agreement alone
gives the tenant the right to utilize the rent deposit remedy.
If there has been a breach of obligations by the landlord or a tenant
reasonably believes that such a breach has occurred, the tenant may give
written notice to the landlord of the acts, omissions, or code violations
constituting such breach. The notice is to be sent to the person or place
where rent is normally paid.20 9 This notice is waived, however, if the
landlord fails to provide the tenant with the name and address of the
owner and the owner's agent in writing, either in the rental agreement
or, if the rental agreement is oral, in a separate written notice.
210
Another notice that the landlord may deliver to the tenant would have
the effect of excluding the landlord from the application of this section of
the Act. If a landlord does not rent more than three dwelling units and
gives notice of such fact to the tenant in a written rental agreement or if
the rental agreement is oral, in a written notice at the time of the initial
occupancy, the tenant may not utilize the remedies of this section.211 The
206 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07 (Anderson 1981).
07 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) (Anderson 1981).
20. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (Anderson 1981).
20. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) (Anderson 1981).
210 Owo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.18(C) (Anderson 1981).
211 Ohio REV. CoDE ANN. § 5321.07(C) (Anderson 1981). Thus, a landlord who owns and
resides in one of the units of a four-unit building and rents the other three, would be
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remedies are also not available to residents of private college and
university dormitories.2 12
Once the tenant has given notice of the specific violations by the
landlord, the landlord has a certain amount of time to attempt to satisfy
the tenant. At this point in the process, the parties have the opportunity
to work out the disagreement amongst themselves. Thus, the legislative
scheme relies first on the private resolution of disputes. 213
The landlord can make the requested repairs or can reach an agree-
ment with the tenant about which repairs do or do not need to be done. If
the tenant is thereby satisfied or simply does not want to press the matter
further, nothing else will occur. No court or other governmental body
need be involved.214
If, after a reasonable period of time,21 5 the landlord fails to remedy the
condition, the tenant has three options: 1) the tenant can deposit the
entire amount of the rent due with the clerk of the court; 2) the tenant can
apply to the court for an order that the condition be remedied; 3) the
tenant can terminate the rental agreement. 216 As part of the application
to the court for an order that the landlord remedy the condition, the
tenant may also ask for a reduction in rent until the repairs are made
and/or an order that the monies already deposited be used by the tenant
to remedy the condition.21 7
To exercise any of the above remedies the tenant must be current in
rental payments. 218 Thus, in most situations, a tenant will have to make
a rental payment at the same time as or after giving the notice of breach
of obligations to the landlord.
exempted if he or she did not own other rental property and gave notice of such fact to the
tenant.
212 Id.
213 Chernin v. Welchans, 641 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (N.D. Ohio 1986), affd
F.2d __ (6th Cir. 1988).
214 If, however, the reason for the tenant's notice was a citation by a local housing,
building or health department, further proceedings may occur along those lines in the
enforcement of the Code. Such proceedings are criminal, or at least quasi-criminal, in
nature and would not involve the tenant as a party.
216 OmfO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B)(Anderson 1981). A reasonable period of time will
vary according to the severity of the conditions and the amount of time necessary to cure the
defect. It may be less than thirty days. Katzin v. Murad, No. 46553 (Cuyahoga County, Jan.
5, 1984). For instance, if because of a malfunctioning furnance or a failure by the landlord
to pay utility bills, a tenant is without heat during the winter, a more serious situation is
present and a few days may be deemed insufficient time for the furnace to be repaired.
Unfortunately, this flexibility regarding the notice period is often overlooked and tenants
are advised that they cannot deposit rent with the court until at least thirty days after
giving the required notice.
216 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B)(3) (Anderson 1981).
217 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B(2) (Anderson 1981).
218 Smith v. Wright, 65 Ohio App. 2d 101, 105, 416 N.E.2d 655, 659 (1979).
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The remedy that is practical for most tenants at this stage is the deposit
of rent. Application for a court order for repairs is simply not going to be
undertaken by most tenants who, at least at this stage of the process, are
without representation. Terminating the rental agreement is a rather
drastic measure for most tenants who would not relish the prospect of
moving given the problems of finding another suitable dwelling unit,
moving expenses and a security deposit for a new unit, and is not likely
to be utilized unless the conditions are bad enough to force the tenant
out.2 1 9
If the tenant chooses to deposit rent with the proper court, the clerk of
the court has certain duties according to the Act: give written notice to
the landlord and to the landlord's agent, if any;220 place the rent money
in an escrow account; keep a separate docket account for each deposit.
The statute does not direct the clerk to in any way ascertain whether the
rent deposit is proper. Nevertheless, some courts require proof that the
tenant is current in rental payments and has given proper notice to the
landlord.221 Other courts have required the tenant to show that proper
grounds exist for the rent deposit at a hearing prior to acceptance of the
deposit.222 While the requirement of a pre-rent deposit hearing has been
successfully challenged,223 some courts still require the tenant to obtain
permission to deposit rent.224 Such procedural hurdles are not required by
219 Such a situation would constitute a constructive eviction. Keener v. Ewert, 65 Ohio
App. 2d 17, 425 N.E.2d 914 (1979).
220 This notice requirement is waived by the landlord's failure to provide written notice
of the name and address of the owner and owner's agent, if any. Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5321.18(C) (Anderson 1981).
221 See, e.g., Chernin v. Welchans, 641 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (N.D. Ohio 1986), affd
__ F.2d - (6th Cir. 1988). The Cleveland Heights Municipal Court requires a
tenant who wishes to rent deposit to sign an affidavit swearing that the preconditions have
been met. Id.
222 Morris Inv. v. Kettman, No. 80-CV-10735 (Franklin County, Mar. 20, 1981); Rallie v.
Pastor, No. M-76-CVG-46763 (Franklin County, Apr. 11, 1977).
22 State ex rel. Taynor v. Hysell, 19 Ohio App. 3d 120, 483 N.E.2d 156 (1984). In a
mandamus action, the court of appeals directed the clerk of the Franklin County Municipal
Court to follow the statute and accept rent deposits without a prior hearing.
224 For example, in the Cleveland Municipal Court, the tenant who presents rent for
deposit at the clerk's office is directed to the Housing Court Specialist for approval. Only
after meeting with the specialist and obtaining written permission can the tenant have her
rent accepted by the clerk's office. The tenant is then given a date, within fourteen days, for
a hearing to determine if the procedural prerequisites for the deposit have been met. At the
hearing, the tenant will be required to verify that rent was current and that notice was
provided. RuL.s OF THE Hous. Div. OF THE CLEv. Mu . CouRT 2.601(A). This hearing is held by the
Housing Court Specialist, who makes the determination as to whether the deposit is proper.
Keating, Judicial Approaches to Urban Housing Problems: A Study of the Cleveland
Housing Court, 19 URB. LAW. 345 (1987)[hereinafter Keating]. This decision is not reviewed
by any judicial officer. If the specialist decides the deposit was improper, the rent is released
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the statute,225 nor is a hearing prior to a rent deposit necessary to satisfy
due process requirements.
226
These court-created procedures have the effect of adding additional
steps to the rent deposit procedure and may result in discouraging
tenants from availing themselves of this remedy. 227 By involving the
court at an earlier time than is contemplated by the statute, the
legislative effort to "fashion a process for dealing with landlord-tenant
disputes which minimizes governmental participation" 228 is partially
undermined. As the statute is designed, the parties may still work out the
dispute amongst themselves after rent has been deposited. If the problem
can be resolved prior to any court hearing, the landlord can obtain the
release of the rent with the tenant's consent.229 Thus, at this stage in the
statutory scheme governmental participation is still minimal.230
Only if the parties are unable to resolve the dispute themselves should
the court become involved in more than an escrow agent capacity. The
landlord may file a complaint with the municipal court for the release of
the rent on the grounds that: 1) the conditions complained of have been
remedied; 2) the tenant was not current in rental payments or did not
give the required notice prior to depositing rent; 3) there was no violation
of any obligation by the landlord. 23 1 The tenant is to be named as a
defendant to any action filed by the landlord232 and, as in any other civil
case, has an opportunity to file an answer and counterclaims. 23 3 Thus, no
hearing on the landlord's application for the release of rent should be had
until the tenant has been served with process and has had the opportu-
nity to file a responsive pleading.
The hearing is to be held within sixty days of the filing of the
complaint. 23 4 Although the statute provides that for good cause shown,
the hearing may be continued beyond the sixty-day period, a recent
federal court decision holds that, while the rest of the rent deposit
to the tenant. Star & Keating, An Evaluation of the Cleveland Housing Court
(1986)(unpublished report)[hereinafter Star & Keating].
225 State ex rel. Taynor v. Hysell, 19 Ohio App. 3d 120, 483 N.E.2d 156 (1984).
22 Chernin v. Welchans, 641 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (N.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd
F.2d _ (6th Cir. 1988).
227 See Star & Keating, supra note 224, at 76-79.
228 Chernin, 641 F. Supp. at 1356.
229 Omuo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.09(A)(1) (Anderson 1981).
230 Chernin, 641 F. Supp. at 1356.
231 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.09(A) (Anderson 1981).
232 The statute directs that the tenant is to be named as a party to such actions. Orno REv.
CODE ANN. § 5321.09(B) (Anderson 1981)(emphasis added). Perhaps because this language
does not specify that the tenant is to be named as the defendant in such actions, some courts
allow the tenant to be named as a plaintiff. However, since any such action is filed by the
landlord, the landlord is clearly the plaintiff.
233 OHuo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.09(B) (Anderson 1981).
234 Id.
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provisions satisfy the due process requirements, the provision allowing
for continuance of the hearing must be struck since not holding a hearing
until after that time would constitute an unreasonable delay and a denial
of due process.235
The statute further provides the landlord the opportunity for an
expedited hearing on a motion for a partial release of rent.236 If the
landlord needs a portion of the rent to make payments for a mortgage,
insurance, taxes, utilities, repairs and other customary costs during the
pendency of an action filed pursuant to section 5321.09,237 he may apply
for a partial release of the rent to cover such expenses. Since the statute
provides that certain factors are to be considered by the court in deciding
whether to allow a partial release, it follows that the partial release
should not automatically be granted. The tenant is entitled to notice of
the hearing on such a motion. The hearing should not be an ex parte
proceeding 238 or be granted as a matter of course. The landlord should
have to make a particularized showing of the need for the partial
release.239 An order for partial release is not a final appealable order,
although a series of partial releases resulting in the release of the entire
amount deposited might conceivably constitute a final appealable
order.240
The statute provides for protection for landlords from bad faith rent
deposits. 241 If, upon the filing of an action for release of rent and a
subsequent hearing, the court finds after a hearing that the condition
complained of by the tenant was the fault of the tenant or that the tenant
intentionally acted in bad faith in depositing rent, the landlord may
recover actual damages caused by the rent deposit.242 In addition, if the
finding is that the tenant intentionally acted in bad faith, the landlord
may recover attorney fees. 243
While the intentional bad faith showing is a high standard that will
rarely be met, it should be noted that, once again, the statute inequitably
provides for the recovery of attorney fees only by the landlord. A tenant
235 Chernin v. Welchans, 641 F. Supp. 1349, 1357 (N.D. Ohio 1986), affd
F.2d __ (6th Cir. 1988).
"3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.10 (Anderson 1981).
237 The pendency of an action under section 5321.09 is a prerequisite to the partial
release of rent under section 5321.10. Blum v. Pennington, No. 42422 (Cuyahoga County,
Feb. 5, 1981)(citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.09-. 10 (Anderson 1981)).
238 Id.
239 Gill v. Zipkin, No. 78-LLT88 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct., Oct. 31, 1978); Landlord-Tenant,
supra note 6, at 916.
240 Pratt v. Dykema, No. 44624 (Cuyahoga County, Dec. 31, 1981).
241 Chernin v. Welchans, 641 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (N.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd
F.2d __ (6th Cir. 1988).
242 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.09(D) (Anderson 1981).
243 Id.
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who deposits rent in an attempt to have conditions remedied and is then
faced with a complaint filed by the landlord alleging a bad faith deposit
and seeking attorneys fees, must either defend against the complaint pro
se or hire an attorney at the tenant's own expense. The tenant has no
hope of being reimbursed for attorney fees unless another statutory
violation is proven, such as retaliation.24 4 The prospect of fighting such
an action can act as a severe deterrent to a tenant who has deposited rent,
even if it is clear that the deposit was in good faith. To alleviate this
deterrence and to make the rent deposit provision more equitable,
provision should be made for attorney's fees to be recovered by a tenant
who is successful in defeating an action for release of rent.
Aside from the deficiency regarding attorney fees, on its face the rent
deposit section of the statute seems to be a well-constructed remedy
which can be utilized by tenants to pressure landlords to maintain rental
units in accordance with state and local standards. Ideally, the process
should encourage the parties to work out their differences with minimal
involvement of the court. 245
However, it does not seem that the availability and use of the remedy
is achieving the desired results.246 One cause for this lack of success is
that the application of the statutory scheme by the courts has undercut
the effectiveness of the remedy. The obstacles encountered by tenants
attempting to deposit rent may discourage some tenants from
depositing.247 Such obstacles, not included in the statutory scheme, may
give tenants the impression that the court is less than enthusiastic about
a tenant's exercise of this remedy. Also possibly discouraging to tenants
is the apparent ease by which landlords can secure a release of rents in
many cases.24 8 Finally, there is the treatment of motions for rent
abatement and counterclaims for the reduced value of the premises raised
by tenants in rent deposit cases. Such motions and claims are rarely
successful. 249 This result may stem from the reluctance of some courts to
recognize the contractual nature of the rental agreement. 250 A tenant
whose rent is not reduced, even prospectively while waiting for repairs to
244 Oino REV. CODE Aj. § 5321.02 (Anderson 1981).
245 Chernin, 641 F. Supp. at 1356.
246 Keating, supra note 224, at 350.
247 See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
24' For instance, in Pratt v. Dykema, No. 44624 (Cuyahoga County, Dec. 31, 1981), the
tenant complained on appeal that the landlord had obtained a partial release of the rent
despite failing to state any of the statutory reasons for release of the rent and that the
tenant did not have sufficient notice of the hearing. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal holding that the partial release was not a final appealable order.
249 For example, a review of the 108 rent deposits in the Housing Division of the
Cleveland Municipal Court in 1984 shows that in only one case was rent released to a
tenant to make repairs. Star & Keating, supra note 224, at 74.
260 See cases cited infra note 265.
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be made, is more likely to move than to continue to pay for a sub-standard
dwelling. Thus, the landlord who can then obtain a release of the rent
escrow has little incentive to make the repairs.
c. Remedy for Retaliation
The prohibition against retaliation is discussed elsewhere in this
Article.251 For our purposes here, we need only stress that retaliation
may be asserted as either a defense or a counterclaim to an eviction
action, or both.252 Thus, if the tenant is involved in protected activity
such as complaining to the landlord about the conditions of the premises,
and the landlord brings or threatens to bring an eviction action against
the tenant, the tenant may assert the landlord's retaliatory motive as a
defense to the eviction. The tenant may also base a claim for damages on
the retaliation.
Once again, while the statute on its face seems to provide adequate
protection for tenants, due to its application by the courts it falls
somewhat short.253 Because actual damages are often difficult to prove
and because attorney fees are only recoverable upon proof of actual
damages, the statute loses much of its deterrent effect. In order to
strengthen this section, it needs to be amended to provide for statutory
damages. 254
d. Remedies for Landlord Self-Help
In the preceding discussion about the Act's prohibition of self-help
evictions and lockouts, we argued that the statute would seem to permit
recovery of punitive damages both because of the "all damages" lan-
guages of section 5321.15 and because these damages should be consid-
ered tort damages. 255 For the same reasons, tenants should be able to
recover tort-style damages for mental anguish, emotional distress, etc.
suffered as a result of a violation of section 5321.15.
Once again, while various theories for recovery can be put forth, these
types of damages are often difficult to prove and the result may be that
the tenant is without a practical remedy. Again, the statute would be
stronger with a statutory damages and attorneys fees provision.256
251 See supra notes 108-24 and accompanying text.
252 Smith v. Wright, 65 Ohio App. 2d 101,106,416 N.E.2d 655 (1979); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5321.02(B)(Anderson 1981).
113 See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
254 The retaliation provisions of both the MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra
note 46, § 2-407, and the UNiF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT, supra note 47, § 5-101
provide for statutory damages of three months rent or three times the actual damages
suffered by the tenant, whichever is greater.
255 See supra text accompanying notes 90-98.
211 See MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 46, § 2-408 and UNW. REsIDEN-
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e. Remedies for Illegal Lease Terms
The Act provides that certain types of lease terms will not be enforced.
As discussed below, these include the specific terms listed in section
5321.13 and terms that are found unconscionable pursuant to section
5321.14.257 However, these two sections do not provide for any remedy
except that the offending provisions shall not be enforced. No damages or
attorney fees are provided. While the inclusion of such prohibited
provisions may be a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act,
as discussed elsewhere in this Article, it would be preferable to directly
provide in the Act for statutory damages for the inclusion of prohibited or
unconscionable lease terms. 258
2. Common Law Remedies
A tenant is not limited to the remedies specifically outlined in the Act.
As the Ohio Supreme Court has definitively stated, the remedies provided
in the Act are not exclusive; rather, they are cumulative and were meant
to supplement other remedies available to tenants.2 9 The Act specifically
provides that either party to the rental agreement may hold the other
liable for the breach of any duty imposed by the law.260 Not only the
duties imposed by the Landlord-Tenant Act are covered; liability may
also attach for the breach of duties imposed by other statutes, the contract
between the parties or common law duties.
a. Remedies for Breach of Contract
Prior to the Act, some Ohio courts had recognized the contractual
nature of the landlord-tenant relationship. 261 For instance, one decision,
recognized as a forerunner to the statute,262 interpreted the lease as a
contract and even went so far as to incorporate local building, housing
and health codes into the agreement.26
TLAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT, supra note 47, § 4-107, both of which provide for statutory
damages of three months' rent or three times the actual damages suffered.
257 See infra text accompanying notes 314-24.
2. Statutory damages for inclusion of prohibited provisions in rental agreements are
provided in the UNF. RESIDENLIL LANDLORD AND TENA Acr, supra note 47, § 1-403.
211 Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 25, 427 N.E.2d 774, 777 (1981).
60 "In any action under Chapter 5321 of the Revised Code, any party may recover
damages for the breach of contract or the breach of any duty that is imposed by law." Owo
REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Anderson 1981).
261 See Lauch v. Monning, 15 Ohio App. 2d 112, 239 N.E.2d 675 (1968), where the court
determined that, since the eviction action was based on a contract, a municipal court had
jurisdiction to entertain an equitable defense in an eviction action, i.e., that the course of
dealing in accepting late rental payments waived the right to claim forfeiture.
262 Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972).
263 Id.
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Some post-Act decisions have also recognized the contractual nature of
the landlord-tenant relationship and have entertained contractual
claims.26 Since section 5321.12 itself states that damages may be
recovered by any party for the breach of contract, such claims would seem
to be specifically authorized by the statute. Yet, other decisions have
inexplicably failed to recognize claims by tenants for breach of con-
tract.265 In light of Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc.,266 these decisions no
longer carry any weight.
While Shroades concerned only a tort claim, its reasoning implicitly
applies to contractual claims as well. In Shroades, the court determined
that the remedies in the Act are not exclusive. 26 7 Therefore, a tenant may
look outside the remedies provided in Chapter 5321 and can rely on
traditional theories to remedy a breach of a lease agreement.
The recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Smith v. Padgett,26
8
settled the question of how the tenant's damages for breach of contract
are to be measured. There the court adopted the "diminution-in-value"
rule as applied by earlier Ohio courts.269 According to this rule, "the
measure of damages is the difference between the rental value of the
premises in their unrepaired condition and what the rental value would
have been had the repairs been made."
270
264 See, e.g., Lobo v. Hoelscher, 44 Ohio Misc. 46, 48 (1975), one of the first reported cases
interpreting the Act, holding that the Act had "changed the tenant-landlord relationship
from a simple conveyance of an interest in real estate into a contractual relationship."
265 See Laster v. Bowman, 52 Ohio App. 2d 379, 370 N.E.2d 767 (1977), where the court
refused to recognize certain claims by the tenant based on breach of contract. In its decision
the court discounted Glyco on the ground that it was decided prior to the Act. Id. at 392, 370
N.E.2d at 775. (Yet the same Court of Appeals, two years later in The Pagoda Co. pointed
to Glyco as a forerunner of the Act). Again in Krutsch v. Republic Steel Corp., No. 43062
(Cuyahoga County, Oct. 1, 1981) the same Court of Appeals held that the Act does not
authorize a contract action for damages to personal property caused by a breach of the
landlord's obligations.
266 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 25, 427 N.E.2d 774, 779 (1981).
267 Thus, Laster v. Bowman, 52 Ohio App. 2d 379, 370 N.E.2d 767, (1977), which held
that the Act provides the exclusive remedies for the landlord's breach, is directly contra-
dicted by Shroades. Furthermore, Krutsch v. Republic Steel, No. 43062 (Cuyahoga County,
Oct. 1, 1981), relied heavily on Thrash v. Hill, 63 Ohio St. 2d 178, 407 N.E.2d 495 (1980),
the case that was directly overruled by Shroades, 68 Ohio St. 2d at 26, 427 N.E.2d at 778.
26 32 Ohio St. 3d 344, 513 N.E.2d 737 (1987).
269 Holder v. Farmakis, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 279, 282, 117 N.E.2d 491, 494 (1951); Cochran
v. Widra, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 608, 611, 41 N.E.2d 875, 877 (1931).
270 32 Ohio St. 3d at 347. In adopting the "diminution-in-value" rule, the Court rejected
an alternative proposed by The Cleveland Tenants Organization as amicus curiae. That
organization proposed the "reduction-in-use" measure of damages, in which damages would
be based upon the percentage by which the value of the premises was diminished by the
landlord's failure to repair. Such an approach has been utilized in other jurisdictions. E.g.,
Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); Green v. Superior Court of San
Francisco, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974). The Court did indicate,
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The court also gave some guidance as to how the two values being
weighed-the value of the premises had repairs been made and the value
of the premises in the unrepaired condition-can be calculated. First, the
court held that the amount of rent agreed upon by the parties is
presumptive, though not conclusive, evidence of the value of the premises
as repaired. 271 Second, the court held that a tenant is competent to give
opinion testimony as to the rental value of the leased premises even
absent a showing of expertise in real estate and rental value.2 7 2 Now both
owners and lessees of real property are competent to give opinion
testimony as to the rental value of the property,27 3 and it is not necessary
to obtain expert testimony. The weight to be accorded the non-expert
testimony of an owner or lessee is a matter to be determined by the trier
of fact.27 4
b. Tort Remedies
In Thrash v. Hill,276 the Ohio Supreme Court applied a very restrictive
view to the Act, holding that the General Assembly, despite its enact-
ment of comprehensive legislation governing the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship, did not abrogate the common law rule that landlords could not
be held liable in tort for injuries to tenants sustained as a result of the
landlord's failure to make repairs to the premises. 276 Despite the fact that
the Act clearly imposes a duty upon landlords to keep residential
premises in good repair, the Thrash court held that a tenant could not
hold a landlord liable in tort to remedy such a breach since the Act did not
specifically alter the common law tort immunities of landlords. Instead,
the Court indicated that a tenant must resort to the remedies created by
the Act.277
This restrictive interpretation of the statute did not last long. The court
was soon presented with another chance to interpret the Act in Shroades
v. Rental Homes, Inc.,278 a case that had been decided at the appellate
level prior to the litigants' awareness of the decision in Thrash and with
however, that such a measure of damages could be appropriate where a tenant shows that
the premises are in whole or in part rendered uninhabitable. 32 Ohio St. 3d at 346.
271 32 Ohio St. 3d at 347.
272 Id. at 348.
13 Owners of real property had long been recognized as competent to give such
testimony. See, e.g., Bishop v. East Ohio Gas Co., 143 Ohio St. 541, 56 N.E.2d 164 (1944).
274 Smith v. Padgett, 32 Ohio St. 3d 344, 348, 513 N.E.2d 737 (1987).
275 63 Ohio St. 2d 178, 407 N.E.2d 495 (1980).
276 Id. at 180-81, 407 N.E.2d at 498.
277 Id. The Court quoted Laster v. Bowman, 52 Ohio App. 2d 379, 382, 370 N.E.2d 767,
770 (1977) which had held that the Act creates "the exclusive remedies now available to
landlords and tenants as to the rights and obligations contained in the Act." (emphasis in
original).
278 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).
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the opposite result. The second time, the court correctly determined that
the legislature, in passing the Act, had meant to expand the rights of
tenants. The court held that not only were tort remedies available to
tenants pursuant to section 5321.12, but that the legislature had negated
previous common law tort immunities for landlords.279 Indeed, a failure
by a landlord to fulfill the duties imposed by the Act was held to
constitute negligence per se.
In light of the pronouncement in Shroades as to the availability of tort
remedies, it would seem that common law tort principles can be applied
along with other tort theories. For instance, in a companion case to
Shroades the court held that a landlord can be held liable for the
negligence of a contractor hired by the landlord if such negligence causes
injury to the guest of a tenant.280 Other tort claims that could arise from
the landlord-tenant relationship include conversion, trespass, 28 ' and
malicious prosecution. 28 2 However, as of yet, a landlord will not be held
liable for the criminal act of a third person.2 83 Nor will a landlord be held
liable for failure to remove ice and snow from common areas. 284
c. Other Statutory Remedies
Since section 5321.12 provides that either party may raise claims based
on the breach of any obligation under the law, a tenant could logically
combine a claim made pursuant to any of the provisions of Chapter 5321
with any other statutory claim the tenant might have. A particular
statute that could be implicated in many landlord-tenant matters is the
Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA).2s5
The primary question to be answered regarding a claim pursuant to the
CSPA is whether the rental of the property constitutes a consumer
transaction. Although this question is one of first impression in Ohio, a
number of courts in other jurisdictions have held that the leasing of real
property is a consumer transaction subjecting a landlord to possible
sanctions under consumer protection laws.
The leading case in this area is Commonwealth v. Monumental Prop-
erties, Inc.,28 6 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that "the
leasing of residences falls within the ambit of the Consumer Protection
279 Id. at 25, 427 N.E.2d at 777-78.
280 Strayer v. Lindeman, 68 Ohio St. 2d 32, 427 N.E.2d 781 (1981).
21 Baker v. Loudermilk, No. 76 AP 770 (Franklin County, Mar. 29, 1977).
282 Reenan v. Klein, 3 Ohio App. 3d 142, 444 N.E.2d 63 (1981).
283 Thomas v. Hart Realty, Inc., 17 Ohio App. 3d 83, 477 N.E.2d 668 (1984); See Moore,
Landlord's Liability to Tenants for Injuries Criminally Inflicted by Third Person, 17 AKRON
L. REv. 395 (1984).
284 LaCourse v. Fleitz, 28 Ohio St. 3d 209, 503 N.E.2d 159 (1986).
285 Ofo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01 to 1345.77 (Anderson 1981).
28 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).
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Law." The court based its holding on several theories: case law involving
the modern interpretation of residential leases; traditional common law;
legislative intent in solving social problems; and the consequences of
holding to the contrary. In following the modern view of the apartment
dweller the court held that the leasing of residential property involves
the landlord exchanging for periodic payments of money (rent) a bundle
of goods and services, rights and obligations. Therefore, held the court,
"the modern apartment dweller is a consumer of housing services. ' '287
The analysis of the court in Monumental Properties is particularly
instructive when looking at the CSPA. First, the court looked closely at
the legislative history of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law 28 8 and determined that it was to be liberally
construed to effect its purpose of protecting consumers. Similarly, the
Ohio Act is intended to protect Ohio consumers from deceptive acts and
is a remedial statute.289 As a remedial statute, it should be construed
liberally in favor of the persons it is designed to protect, i.e.,
consumers.
290
Also deserving of special attention is the reliance of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and the
interpretation thereof.291 The court analyzed the interpretation of the
FTCA in both judicial and administrative proceedings and held that such
precedent counseled for the inclusion of the leasing of housing under the
protection of the Consumer Protection Law. That analysis is especially
instructive in interpreting the Ohio CSPA because it explicitly directs
the court to also look to FTCA precedent. 292
A third part of the Monumental Properties analysis is the court's
functional view of the economic reality of the modern housing market.
This analysis led the court to view an apartment dweller as a consumer
of a package of goods and services who is afforded the protection of the
consumer laws. In making this determination, the court looked at
precedents in other states and cited to an Ohio Supreme Court case,
257 Id. at 459, 329 A.2d at 820.
288 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-1 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
259 Brown v. Market Dev., Inc., 41 Ohio Misc. 57, 322 N.E.2d 367 (1974).
2o "Remedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice. The rule of the common
law that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed has no
application to remedial laws .. " Omio Rsv. CODE AxN. § 1.11 (Anderson 1981).
291 Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450,329 A.2d 812, 818-19 (1974).
292 (C) In construing division (A) of this section, the court shall give due consideration
and great weight to federal trade commission orders, trade regulation rules and guides, and
the federal courts' interpretations of subsection 45(a)(1) of the "Federal Trade Commission
Act," 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 41, as amended.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Anderson 1981).
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Brenner v. Spiegle,293 where it was held that a lease is really a sale of an
interest in property. Thus, there is precedent in Ohio for the functional
view of the tenant as a housing consumer.
Other jurisdictions have similarly applied consumer laws to landlord-
tenant cases. Of special interest for Ohio courts is the interpretation of
the Illinois Consumer Protection Statute.294 In People v. Hedrich295 the
court liberally construed the statute and, also relying on FTC precedent,
held that the rental of real estate, specifically lots in mobile home parks,
was a consumer transaction. In Carter v. Mueller,296 the court held that
the Illinois Consumer and Deceptive Business Practices Act applied to
the lease of residential apartments and that the lessee was a "consumer"
under the Act.
2 9 7
One reported decision in which a court has specifically determined that
a state's consumer protection legislation does not cover a landlord-tenant
transaction is Chelsea Plaza Homes, Inc. v. Moore.298 The rationale for the
Kansas court's decision, however, does not apply to the Ohio CSPA. The
court there did not hold that a landlord-tenant transaction is not a
consumer transaction. Instead, the court based its decision on its inter-
pretation of the Kansas Residential Landlord and Tenant Act which, held
the court, "controls and preempts the field."299
Examination of Ohio's Landlord-Tenant Act and the Ohio Supreme
Court's interpretation thereof reveals that the holding in Chelsea Plaza is
totally inapplicable in interpreting the Ohio statute. The Ohio Landlord-
Tenant Act specifically provides that landlords and tenants are not
foreclosed from other causes of action.300 Further, following Shroades v.
Rental Homes, Inc.,30 1 the remedies provided by Chapter 5321 are not
293 116 Ohio St. 631, 632, 157 N.E. 491, 491 (1927).
294 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, paras. 261-272 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). The Illinois statute,
it should be noted, is listed as "Comparative Legislation" to the Ohio Consumer Sales
Practices Act. Ouio REV. CODE ANN. ch. 1345 (Anderson 1981).
21 People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich, 108 Ill. App. 3d 83, 90, 438 N.E.2d 924, 928-29
(1982)(park owner's violations of Mobile Home Parks Act governing relationship between
park and tenants can also be prosecuted by Attorney General as acts of unfair competition).
296 120 Ill. App. 3d 314, 457 N.E.2d 1335 (1983).
297 See Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 464 A.2d 847 (1983)(landlord's violations of
landlord-tenant statute constitute violations of Unfair Trade Practices Act); Goes v.
Feldman, 8 Mass. App. 84, 391 N.E.2d 943 (1979)(claims for violation of Massachusetts
Consumer Protection Act stemming from landlord-tenant relationship may be within
jursdiction of Boston Housing Court); Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574
(1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978) (landlord who owns 76 units of
rental housing falls within the scope of consumer protection statutes); Cf. People v. MeKale,
25 Cal. 3d 626, 602 P.2d 731, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1979).
2s 226 Kan. 430, 601 P.2d 1100 (1979).
299 Id. at 433, 601 P.2d at 1104.
'oo Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Anderson 1981).
301 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 25, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).
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exclusive. Therefore, unlike those in Kansas, tenants and landlords in
Ohio may utilize remedies other than those found in the Landlord-Tenant
Act, including remedies under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.
Another case holding a state's consumer protection legislation inappli-
cable to a landlord-tenant relationship is State v. Schwab.3° 2 There, the
court determined, from the legislative histories of both the state's
Consumer Protection Act3a3 and Residential Landlord-Tenant Act,
304
that residential landlord-tenant disputes are not covered by the Con-
sumer Protection Act. The Court specifically relied on the fact that a
proposed amendment to the Landlord-Tenant Act which would have
provided that a violation of the Landlord-Tenant Act should be construed
as also a violation of the Consumer Protection Act had been rejected.30 5
Again, the particular basis for the decision in that case makes it
inapplicable to Ohio. Because no such legislative history exists to justify
a restrictive interpretation of Ohio's relevant statutes, the CSPA and the
Landlord-Tenant Act should be viewed as complementary to each other.
Looking at the definitional section of the CSPA itself also leads to the
conclusion that leases of apartments are consumer transactions covered
by the CSPA.306
The definition of "consumer transaction" includes the lease of goods,
services, and intangibles and would thus include the lease of the whole
range of goods and services purchased by the modern apartment dweller.
The definition does exclude certain transactions but, significantly, does
not exclude leases or rental of real property. According to ordinary
principles of statutory construction, transactions not specifically excluded
would presumably be included in the coverage of the statute. If the rental
of residential property is considered a consumer transaction, both rental
practices and rental agreements themselves would be subject to the
provisions of the CSPA prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices and
tenant-consumers could avail themselves of its remedies.30 7
302 103 Wash. 2d 542, 693 P.2d 108 (1985).
303 WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.86 (1978).
'o4 WAsH. REv. CODE § 59.18 (Supp. 1987).
305 Schwab, 103 Wash. 2d 542, 693 P.2d at 113.
306 As used in sections 1345.01 to 1345.13 of the Revised Code:
(A) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance,
or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, franchise, or an intangible, except
those transactions between persons, defined in sections 4905.03 and 5725.01 of the
Revised Cede, and their customers, those between attorneys, physicians, or
dentists and their clients or patients, or those between veteranarians and their
patients that pertain to medical treatment but not ancillary services, to an
individaul for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household, or
solicitation to supply any of these things.
Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 (Anderson 1981).
307 Such remedies include minimal statutory damages and attorneys fees.
Orno Rsv. CODE AN. § 1345.09 (Anderson 1981).
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G. Lease Terms
In order to prevent the erosion of the new rights and remedies being
accorded to tenants, provisions governing written leases were included in
the statute. The evil sought to be remedied was the use of lease clauses
which would nullify the intended equalizing provisions of the Act. No
doubt the restrictions on the use of unconscionable practices and adhesion
contracts in other areas of the law had some influence on the drafters.30 8
A rental agreement in Ohio is any agreement between a landlord and
a tenant setting forth the terms and conditions of the living
arrangement. 30 9 As such, a rental agreement may be oral or written, and
the Act does not attempt to differentiate between the mode of establish-
ing the agreement. Thus, since the rights and remedies outlined by the
Act become a part of every rental agreement 10 and the Act does not
distinguish between oral and written agreements, all tenants have
common rights under the Act and are not without recourse merely
because there are no written terms.
Paradoxically, in some situations the tenant may be in an inferior
position if he/she is bound by a written lease since, in the absence of the
lease, the tenant has all the protections of the law, while a lease may
contain terms which would take away some of those rights. The Act,
however, contains certain provisions designed to avoid such conse-
quences.
Residential leases are covered by the Act's definition of the term,
"rental agreement." In addition, the Act has other sections which prohibit
certain terms in leases, 311 provide that terms inconsistent with Chapter
5321 are not to be included in a rental agreement,312 and provide that
unconscionable terms of rental agreements may be held unenforceable. 313
Terms which are prohibited in written residential leases are delineated
in the Act.3 14 Included in these terms are prohibitions on confessions of
judgment, warrants of attorney, limitations on the landlord's liability,
and other oppressive terms which were legal prior to the enactment of
30 Baillis, supra note 2, at 125-26. Specific statutes dealing with unconscionability
include the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Orno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01 (Anderson
1981); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1302.15 (Anderson 1981); and the Ohio Land Installment
Contract Act, O1Uo REV. CoDE ANN. § 5313.01 to 5313.10 (Anderson 1981).
09 Omo REv. CODE ANs. § 5321.01(D) (Anderson 1981) defines a rental agreement as
"[a]ny agreement or lease, written or oral, which establishes or modifies the terms,
conditions, rules, regulations, or any other provisions concerning the use and occupancy of
residential premises by one of the parties."
310 Laster v. Bowman, 52 Ohio App. 2d 379, 382, 370 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1977).
1 Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.13 (Anderson 1981).
312 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.06 (Anderson 1981).
313 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (Anderson 1981).
314 Omo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 5321.13 (Anderson 1981).
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Chapter 5321.316 In addition, even though not spelled out, other lease
terms which are unconscionable in their context or application may be
stricken under the Act,3 16 and terms which are inconsistent with other
provisions of the statute are prohibited under Chapter 5321.3 ' 7 For
example, in one case the lease provision which granted the landlord the
right to lock the tenant out of the apartment was held to be inconsistent
with the prohibition on lockouts found in Ohio Revised Code section
5321.15 and therefore violative of Ohio Revise Code sections 5321.13 and
5321.14.318
Many of the lease terms which have been determined to be unconscio-
nable concern automatic renewals of leases and fees such as liquidated
damages clauses.3 19 Many liquidated damages clauses are inconsistent
with the security deposit sections of the Act. 320 Such an inconsistent
clause would be violative of either section 5321.06, prohibiting lease
terms inconsistent with Chapter 5321 or section 5321.14, which renders
unconscionable lease agreements or parts thereof unenforceable. Other
provisions found to be unconscionable under the Act include a fifty dollar
per day charge for the presence of a motorcycle, 3 21 a requirement to report
overnight guests, 322 and an attempt to alter the legal notice provisions for
eviction purposes.323 However, lease terms providing for the waiver of the
right to a jury trial have been permitted in rental agreements.3 24
"' For an excellent discussion of pre-1974 Ohio law see Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6,
at 949-55.
311 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (Anderson 1981).
3" Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6, at 955-56. Since section 5321.14 is taken almost
verbatim from section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, cases interpreting UCC
section 2-302 provide an excellent source of precedent. Baillis, supra note 2, at 142-43.
318 Thomas v. Papedelis, 16 Ohio App. 3d 359, 359-60, 476 N.E.2d 726 (1984).
319 See, e.g., McGowan v. DM Group IX, 7 Ohio App. 3d 349, 455 N.E.2d 1052 (1982)
(re-rental fee).
320 OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.16 (Anderson 1981). An example of an inconsistent clause
would be a clause which calls for forfeit of the security deposit for any violation of the terms
of the rental agreement, one that is quite common in form leases. Such a clause contradicts
the duty of the landlord to itemize any deductions from the security deposit.
321 Berlinger v. Suburban Apt. Mgmt. Co., 7 Ohio App. 3d 122, 454 N.E.2d 1367 (1982).
322 Heritage Hills v. Smith, No. 78-CVG-268 (Chillicothe Mun. Ct., May 1, 1978).
323 Valley Home Mut. Hous. v. Williams, No. C-810923 (Hamilton County, Nov. 3,
1982)(lease provision for ten days grace period in case of rent default was not replaced by
the provisions of section 1923.04 but was an addition to it, given by the landlord through the
lease); Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6, at 950.
324 Union Commerce Bank v. Kimbo, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 279 (1959); Accord Mentor Lagoons,
Inc. v. Geldart, No. 6-265 (Lake County, Jan. 29, 1979); Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Mayor, No.
10-180 (Lake County, Mar. 1, 1985)(same landlord and lease involved in both cases). Kimbo
held that a waiver of jury trial in a forcible entry and detainer case was enforceable since
it served the valid purpose of preserving the summary character of eviction proceedings.
However, in a non-eviction action between a landlord and tenant, such as an action for
damages, there would not be the need to expedite the proceedings and a jury waiver may be
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Whether or not a rental agreement may be automatically renewed is an
issue which has created much litigation in Ohio. Some leases include
either renewal options or automatic renewal provisions so that a tenant
not acting by a certain date finds that the rental agreement has been
either automatically terminated or automatically renewed, depending on
the term found in the agreement. In dealing with these issues, the courts
have determined that if there is an option, it must be positively stated
and exercised to be effective. 3zC Furthermore, lease terms providing for
successive automatic renewals must satisfy the Statute of Frauds.326
An automatic renewal clause provides too great an opportunity for
abuse, especially if the time period for the required notice of non-renewal
is longer than the periodic rental period. A mistake by a tenant is too
likely to result in the tenant being bound for an additional year whether
or not the tenant at the end of the first year intended to renew the
tenancy. While the equitable defenses of accident, fraud, surprise, or
mistake327 may be available, such sophisticated legal theories probably
will not be raised by the typical tenant without an attorney. The Act
should be amended specifically to prohibit such clauses.32
8
unreasonable and unconscionable. This question has not been ruled on by the Ohio Supreme
Court. Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have held jury waiver clauses, included in
fine-print in form leases, unconscionable. See National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565
F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977); Koslowski v. Palmieri, 98 Misc. 2d 885, 414 N.Y.S.2d 599
(1979); Gaylord Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586,588 (Ala. 1981). It is arguable
that such jury waiver clauses also contradict the mandate of section 5321.06 which prohibits
lease terms contrary to law. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.06 (Anderson 1981). Since the
right to a trial by jury is guaranteed by both the Ohio and United States Constitution, a
waiver of such a right can only be given when circumstances indicate an affirmative,
knowing waiver. A waiver embodied in fine print in a form lease can rarely qualify. See
Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412 So. 2d 1197 (Ala. 1982), where the court discussed the factors to
be considered in determining whether to enforce a jury waiver provision of a lease:
(1) whether the waiver is buried in fine print in a long contract; (2) whether the parties had
equal bargaining power; and (3) whether the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made.
Even if a court holds a jury waiver clause contained in a lease to be applicable, a court has
the discretion, upon motion by a party, to order a trial by jury pursuant to OHio R. Civ. P.
39(B). Moknach v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Ohio App. 293, 36 N.E.2d 529 (1941); Kaplan
v. Brown, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 561 (1934); Hamilton v. Miller, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 55 (1936).
325 Ahmed v. Scott, 65 Ohio App. 2d 271, 418 N.E.2d 406 (1979).
326 See Note, Residential Renewal Leases and the Ohio Statute of Conveyances: Invalida-
tion and Subsequent Treatment, 27 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 231, 243 (1978).
327 See Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Velbeck, No. 10-056 (Lake County, Mar. 23, 1984)
(holding that an equitable defense of mistake is available to a tenant who fails to give notice
of non-renewal due to confusion over the lease term); Ward v. Washington Distrib., 67 Ohio
App. 2d 49, 425 N.E.2d 420 (1980); Friederich v. Matrka, No. 37178 (Cuyahoga County,
Mar. 23, 1978)(automatic renewal invalid when not properly attested).
32 The landlord-tenant law for manufactured home parks, mandates the offer of a lease
of a term of one year or more. Omno REv. CODE ANm. § 3733.11(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
If the initial offer is accepted, the park operator is required to offer a renewal at the end of
the first lease term. The difference of course is that the park resident has the option of
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Another change recommended by the authors would be to add to section
5321.13's list of prohibited rental terms a prohibition against waivers of
the right to a trial by jury. In this way the right to a jury trial would not
only be preserved, but the question of whether or not such a clause is
inconsistent with Ohio law3 29 would be resolved by making such a term
unenforceable in a court of law.
It is highly unlikely that the average tenant, upon signing a form lease
containing a jury waiver clause, comprehends exactly what he is giving
up. The right to a jury trial provided by the Ohio Constitution 3 0 is a basic
right that should only be deemed waived when the waiver is exercised at
the time a person is contemplating legal action, preferably after the
opportunity to seek the advice of an attorney,331 not at the time the
tenant enters into a rental agreement. One would hope that at the time
the tenant signs a lease, the tenant is not really thinking about what sort
of trial he would like to have.3
3 2
While any individual jury waiver clauses could be held unconscionable
under the circumstances of a particular case, such an inquiry would be
time-consuming and would not always lead to just results. A much more
equitable solution would be a blanket prohibition on such waivers. After
all, either party always has the opportunity after the start of litigation
either not to request a trial by jury or to waive a jury prior to trial.333
Finally, it should be noted that some of the more blatantly illegal lease
terms are never tested through litigation. For instance, it is not uncom-
mon to see a clause in a lease giving the landlord the right to immediate
possession upon any breach by the tenant. Such a term is contrary to both
Chapter 5321 and Chapter 1923 regarding the procedures for an action in
forcible entry and detainer. That such a term is illegal and unenforceable
does not mean that a tenant, when faced with the landlord's threat of
throwing the tenant's belongings out onto the street (as the lease seems
to give the landlord the right to do), will not believe that the landlord can
affirmatively accepting or rejecting the offered lease. Such a scheme is preferable to
allowing automatic renewal clauses, even for a single year. In this way a bargain may be
struck by a landlord and tenant for a specific period of time and eliminate the uncertainty
created by automatic renewal and option clauses.
329 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.10 (Anderson 1981) provides for the right to a jury trial in
eviction actions. Ofmo R. Civ. P. 38(A) states: "The right to trial by jury shall be preserved
to the parties inviolate."
330 O0Ho CoNsT. art. I, § 5 (Anderson 1981).
331 Query: would a lease clause that waived the advice of counsel in any litigation arising
from the rental agreement be upheld? It would seem that such a waiver would be deemed
unconscionable and unenforceable.
332 Indeed, one can only speculate as to the reason that a landlord would put such a clause
in a rental agreement. It suggests that the landlord expects or even intends for litigation to
result from this transaction.
s3 Omo R. Civ. P. 38(D), 39(A).
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indeed accomplish such a self-help eviction. The tenant who so believes
may simply succumb to the threat by moving or ceasing to demand
repairs or halting whatever other behavior irks the landlord.
While no Ohio court has yet rendered an opinion on the matter, it is
reasonable to consider lease terms that are directly contrary to law, e.g.,
liquidated damages clauses, etc., as violations of the Ohio Consumer
Sales Practices Act.33 4 Elsewhere in this Article the rationale for appli-
cation of the Consumer Act to landlord-tenant cases is discussed. 335
Assuming that a landlord-tenant relationship is a consumer transaction,
certain of the lease terms discussed above could be considered unfair,
deceptive, and/or unconscionable and, therefore, prohibited by the Con-
sumer Sales Practices Act. There are a number of specific provisions of
this statute that would apply to lease terms that are contrary to law. For
instance, section 1345.03(B) prohibits unconscionable consumer prac-
tices. One factor that is to be considered is whether a supplier of consumer
goods has knowingly taken advantage of a consumer because of his
inability to understand the language of an agreement. A lease term
which is inconsistent with the statute or so ambiguous on its face that it
allows a landlord to take advantage of a tenant who is misled as to his
rights would fit this category. Similarly, a lease that purports to make a
tenant responsible for obligations that are placed by law upon the
landlord (e.g., maintenance of a landlord-supplied furnace) would be a
deceptive act or practice under section 1345.02(B)(10).
Thus, Ohio's consumer laws may provide a remedy for a rental
agreement that misrepresents the respective right and duties of the
parties.
H. Security Deposits: The Landlord's Interest Free Loan
The customary requirement by landlords of a security deposit, a deposit
of funds by the tenant with the landlord to secure performance of the
tenant's obligations under the rental agreement,3 36 was considered a
subject of sufficient importance to mandate its own section of the Act.337
The first paragraph of that provision states:
(A) Any security deposit in excess of fifty dollars or one month's
periodic rent, whichever is greater, shall bear interest on the
114 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 (Anderson 1981).
3 See supra notes 285-307 and accompanying text.
336 See Orio REv. CODE AN. § 5321.01(E) (Anderson 1985) (specifically defining the term
"security deposit").
117 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.16 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1985). As stated by one
commentator, "the legislators were aware of flagrant abuses resulting from the unjustified
retention of 'security deposits' and set out deliberately to reform this area of the law."
Landlord-Tenant, supra note 6, at 944.
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excess at the rate of five percent per annum if the tenant remains
in possession of the premises for six months or more, and shall be
computed and paid annually by the landlord to the tenant.
By its provision for interest on amounts held in excess of one month's
rent, the Act specifically acknowledges that a demand for such an amount
is allowed in Ohio.33 8 The relatively low rate of five percent interest is not
a significant deterrent to a demand of an amount exceeding the tenant's
rent which can be used for the landlord's own purposes during the period
of the tenancy, and beyond. Even at this period of relatively low interest
rates, the landlord is systematically acquiring financing at interest well
below the market rate. Indeed, a landlord who is content with a single
month's rent as security has "a source of free loans." 3 9 This result is in
fundamental conflict with the historical Ohio common law principle that
this money belongs to the tenant and the landlord is liable for its
return.3
40
The security deposit provision is one of the few provisions of the Act
that has been the subject of review by the Supreme Court of Ohio. In
the first of two recent decisions on security deposits, Vardeman v.
Llewellyn,341 the court prefaced its holding by declaring, without benefit
of reference or incorporation of any legislative record, the intent of the
General Assembly in enacting the security deposit sections. The court
stated that intent to be threefold:
One, to specifically permit the landlord, upon termination of the
rental agreement, to deduct from the rental deposit any unpaid
rents and actual damages to the premises occasioned by the
tenant. Two, to require prompt refunds of all or part of the
security deposit or, in the alternative, to provide an explanation
to the tenant why all or any part of the deposit was not returned
to him. And, three, to provide a penalty by way of damages and
... Such is not the case in many jurisdictions. The Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act does not permit the landlord to demand or receive security in an amount in
excess of one month's rent. UNIF. RESIDENM L LmDLoRD-TENANT AcT, supra note 47, § 2-101.
... Vardeman v. Llewellyn, 17 Ohio St. 3d 24, 476 N.E.2d 1038 (1985)(Justice Douglas in
a dissenting opinion, noting that the deposit belongs to the tenant, discussed the absence of
a requirement to place security deposits in a separate account or in escrow to prevent the
problems of landlord insolvency or conversion).
340 In re Morrison-Barnhart Motors, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ohio 1956); Cain v.
Brown, 105 Ohio St. 264, 136 N.E. 916 (1922); Tuteur v. P.& F. Enterprises, Inc., 21 Ohio
App. 2d 122, 255 N.E.2d 284 (1970). The tenant's interest has been measured by one
commentator as the amount he would have gained from a savings deposit. Landlord-
Tenant, supra note 6, at 945. This measure makes the 5% interest reasonable. From the
perspective of Justice Douglas in Vardeman, the more appropriate measure is the cost of
financing which is double or triple the interest provided by the Act.
341 17 Ohio St. 3d 24, 476 N.E.2d 1038 (1985).
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reasonable attorney fees against a noncomplying landlord for the
wrongful withholding of any or all of the security deposit. 342
The court in Vardeman approached the statute with the objective to "not
construe any portion of the Act so as to render an inequity on the
landlords of this state."3 43 In doing so, the court failed to construe the
statute as a remedial statute designed to correct the imbalance between
the rights of landlords and tenants.344 By not liberally construing the Act,
the court limited and in some cases, eliminated, the penalty for violations
of the duty to promptly account to the tenant for the deposit. This
interpretation imposes no penalty on a landlord for exceeding the
statute's time limit for notice to the tenant of damages arising from the
tenancy or for failure to respond to a tenant's inquiries about the deposit
when he can justify, subsequently, the deductions. A tenant could incur
substantial expenses including filing fees, discovery costs, and attorneys
fees only to receive no reimbursement at all if the landlord succeeds in
justifying a total withholding of the security deposit.
In Vardeman, the court held that a landlord who fails to timely account
for the deposit but who does not owe any portion of it to the tenant, is not
liable for damages or attorney fees. The landlord had provided neither
written notice nor an itemization, and the tenant filed a complaint for
return of the security deposit in municipal court. The landlord counter-
claimed for rent due based on a failure to give a full thirty-day notice of
intent to vacate and alleged damages to the apartment, including
cleaning of the carpet, exterior refurbishing, lawn clean-up, and an
unpaid utility bill in the amount of $9.91. The trial court found the
amount owed by the tenant to exceed the security deposit and held that
the landlord was neither liable for double the security deposit nor for
342 Id. at 28.
343 Id.
The court's pronouncement of legislative intent contradicts that of the Lucas County
Appellate Court in Albreqt v. Chen, 17 Ohio App. 3d 79, 477 N.E.2d 1150 (1983). The
Albreqt court, by focusing on a legislative intent to insure prompt return of security
deposits, penalized the untimely itemization by affirming an award of double the security
deposit as damages under the statute. Justice Douglas in his dissent in Vardeman expressed
the legislative intent in somewhat different terms but proposed a result similar to that of
Albreqt v. Chen. "The purpose of considering the question of security deposits in landlord-
tenant legislation was to insure the proper administration of such deposits by means of
procedures designed to encourage tenant pursuit of legal remedies .. " Vardeman, 17 Ohio
St. 3d 24, 30. It is doubtful that the first element of the Vardeman majority's statement of
legislative intent, to enable the landlord to make deductions, was actually a motivating
factor behind the legislation. Since landlords were regularly making deductions prior to the
Act, such a provision was really not necessary. The real intent was to enable the tenant to
obtain the prompt return of the security deposit. It was necessary to restrict the landlord to
deductions for actual damages. Thus, the Act in no way enlarged the rights of landlords
concerning security deposits and the focus of analysis of the security deposit provision
should be, as stated by Justice Douglas, on the increased remedies provided for the tenant.
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attorney fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio
did not consider the propriety of the deductions but limited its decision to
a determination of the meaning of the terms "amount due", "money due"
and "wrongfully withheld" as used in the Act.
345
The terms "amount due" in subsection (B) and "money due" in
subsection (C)346 were held to mean "the security deposit, less any
amounts found to be properly deducted by the landlord for unpaid rent
and damages .... ,,347 Further, "the term 'amount wrongfully withheld'
means the amount found owing from the landlord to the tenant over and
above any deduction that the landlord may lawfully make."3 4 8 The court
specifically rejected an interpretation that would require an automatic
imposition of the full amount of the security deposit plus damages and
attorney fees on the thirty-first day as being beyond the statutory
language. 349 The court concluded that where the landlord was later found
properly to have withheld the portion of the security deposit in question,
the tenant was not damaged and no penalties nor attorney fees may be
awarded to him.350 Thus, according to the Vardeman court, only a tenant
who proves that some amount of money was retained by the landlord is
entitled to recover under subsection (C) of the Act.35 1
341 Vardeman, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 27.
346 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(B),(C) (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1985). The act states as
follows:
(B) Upon termination of the rental agreement any property or money held by
the landlord as a security deposit may be applied to the payment of past due rent
and to the payment of the amount of damages that the landlord has suffered by
reason of the tenant's noncompliance with section 5321.05 of the Revised Code or
the rental agreement. Any deduction from the security deposit shall be itemized
and identified by the landlord in a written notice delivered to the tenant together
with the amount due, within thirty days after termination of the rental agree-
ment and delivery of possession. The tenant shall provide the landlord in writing
with a forwarding address or new address to which the written notice and amount
due from the landlord may be sent. If the tenant fails to provide the landlord with
the forwarding or new address as required, the tenant shall not be entitled to
damages or attorneys fees under division (C) of this section.
(C) If the landlord fails to comply with division (B) of this section, the tenant
may recover the property and money due him, together with damages in an
amount equal to the amount wrongfully withheld, and reasonable attorneys fees.
Id.
141 Vardeman v. Llewellyn, 17 Ohio St. 3d 24, 28-29, 477 N.E.2d 1150 (1985).
348 Id. at 29.
349 Id. at 28.
a50 Id. at 29. This holding is consistent with Jemo Assoc., Inc. v. Garman, 70 Ohio St. 2d
167, 435 N.E.2d 439 (1982); Dyche Fund v. Graves, 55 Ohio App. 2d 153, 380 N.E.2d 767
(1978).
"' This result overrules Sherwin v. Cabana Club Apts., 70 Ohio App. 2d 11, 17-18, 433
N.E.2d 932, 937 (1980), which is discussed at length by Justice Douglas in his dissent in
Vardernan. In Sherwin, an award of attorney fees had been held to be mandatory where the
landlord fails to timely meet his statutory obligation.
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Two issues are left unresolved by Vardeman. The first is whether a
tenant whose deposit or that portion of the deposit due was returned after
the statutory period would be entitled to statutory damages or attorney
fees. The second is whether any itemization, no matter how accurate, if
delivered within thirty days, automatically insulates the landlord from
liability for double damages and attorney fees. The latter question was
answered in the negative by the court in Smith v. Padgett.352
The issue before the court in Smith was whether a timely itemization
of deduction that was found to be incorrect triggered the penalties under
Ohio Revised Code section 5321.16(C). These facts differed from Varde-
man where the landlord failed to itemize but was found not to have owed
the tenant any amount. In Smith, the court below had found $105 to have
been wrongfully withheld. The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that a
landlord would not be deterred from making unfounded deductions from
the security deposit if no penalty were imposed for deductions for "facially
justifiable reasons" that were, in fact, incorrect.353 Therefore, the court
held that liability for double damages and attorney fees is mandatory
when a landlord fails to return a portion of the security deposit even if the
landlord timely provides an itemization of the amount deducted. 54
The Smith court refused to inject a requirement of bad faith into the
statute where the legislature chose not to do so.3 55 The court adopted
appellant's argument that a landlord who fails to return the correct
amount has wrongfully withheld the amount owed, triggering the pen-
alty provisions of the statute.356
The question not yet ruled on by the Ohio Supreme Court is whether
the failure to return a deposit until after the statutory period entitles the
tenant to statutory damages and attorney fees, even though the entire
amount due is eventually returned. However, an appellate court has held
that the late return of the deposit entitles the tenant to the statutory
penalties.357
352 32 Ohio St. 3d 344, 513 N.E.2d 737 (1987).
5 Id. at 349.
354 Id.
... Id. The Smith decision would seem to dispose of a generally unsuccessful defense of
good faith frequently raised by landlords seeking to avoid the damage penalty. Forquer v.
Colony Club, 26 Ohio App. 3d 178, 499 N.E.2d 7 (1985); Paxton v. McGranahan, 25 Ohio B.
352 (1986); Katzin v. Murad, No. 46553 (Cuyahoga County, Jan. 5, 1984). But see Fant v.
Stewart, No. 49089 (Cuyahoga County, May 9, 1985)(landlord's check for tenant's security
deposit was dishonored because of a restraining order placed on the account without
landlord's notice. No damages awarded for landlord's failed attempt to return deposit within
statutory period.) The Smith court relies on the absence of wording that would require a
finding that the landlord willfully and unreasonably refused to return a security deposit to
which the tenant is entitled. 32 Ohio St. 3d at 349 n. 7.
356 32 Ohio St. 3d at 348.
311 Forquer, 26 Ohio App. 3d 178 (1985), held that providing the full amount of the
security deposit beyond the 30-day statutory limit required the levy of the double damages
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The penalties under the Act for an unlawful withholding of the security
deposit are triggered by the tenant's return of possession and a written
notice providing the forwarding or new address of the tenant.3 58 Return
of possession is symbolically accomplished by return of the keys. In cases
where the thirty days notice to vacate has not been provided, courts
determine the allocation of rent from the security deposit from the time
of the return of the keys. 359 A tentative failure to take possession does not
eliminate the landlord's obligation timely to return the security
deposit.3 60
Apart from the question of damages, courts have also dealt with other
security deposit issues. Regarding the notice of forwarding address
required to be provided by the tenant, some courts have relied on the
mandatory language of the Act.36 1 Several courts have waived the
written notice requirement where it can be deduced that the landlord had
actual knowledge.362
On the issue of meeting the thirty-day time limit for itemization and
return of deposit, Ohio courts have discussed what is timely delivery. If
the landlord mails the itemization and/or money due the tenant "with
proper postage and the correct mailing address . ." on or before the
thirtieth day, it will be considered timely.363
One of the questions not considered by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Vardeman is whether the landlord's claimed deductions were properly
considered "damages" for the purposes of calculating the "money due" the
tenant from the security deposit.3 6 4 Damages for which lawful deduction
can be made have been defined by one court as arising from the tenant's
non-compliance with tenant obligations under the Act 36 5 or the rental
clause. The court responded to the landlord's protestation regarding the penalty by stating
that the landlord could have avoided the imposition of attorneys fees by remitting double
the amount withheld voluntarily when the statutory time limit had been exceeded.
w' Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 5321.16(C) (Anderson 1981).
... Carr v. Ed Stein Realtors, 10 Ohio App. 3d 242, 461 N.E.2d 930 (1983).
36o Dearwester v. Lagos, 33 Ohio App. 3d 199, 514 N.E.2d 1136 (1986).
"'l Id. See also Green v. Northwood Terrace Apts., No. 78 AP-580 (Franklin County, Mar.
20, 1979).
362 Prescott v. Makowski, 9 Ohio App. 3d 155, 458 N.E.2d 1281 (1983)(landlord knew
tenant had moved to a building where he was renting from the landlord's sister); Boldan v.
Suburban Apt. Mgmt. Co., No. 84 AP-47089 (Cuyahoga County, Mar. 2, 1984)(where
landlord used address on lease and tenant received the notice, the argument that
recordation failed to meet statutory requirement is rejected).
.e. Paxton v. McGranahan, 25 Ohio B. 352, 354 (1986); Goldstein v. Spitz, 30 Ohio App.
3d 246, 507 N.E.2d 433 (1986).
"' The landlord's deductions included $55.90 for carpet cleaning and $134.00 for exterior
refurbishing and lawn clean-up. Vardeman v. Llewellyn, 17 Ohio St. 3d 24, 25, 476 N.E.2d
1038 (1985).
.e. Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05 (Anderson 1981).
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agreement.3 66 The landlord has the burden of proving the validity of the
deductions.3 67
Damages for which deductions may be made from a security deposit are
conditions not arising from normal wear and tear.3 68 In a recent case, the
court declared that the landlord must prove his right to recover for an
item, "taking into account the fact that plaintiffs (tenants) are not liable
for normal wear and tear to the premises during their occupancy ... ."369
The court ruled that the defendant-landlord had failed to prove its
damages in order to recover on more than two items, patching a carpet
and the broken commode seat. The court was not satisfied, based on
evidence presented at trial, that the remaining items were properly
deductible as damages.
Courts frequently have the opportunity to look at lease provisions
through the "looking glass" of security deposit litigation.3 70 The cases
indicate that some landlords, in attempting to justify retaining funds
originally tendered as security deposits, attempt to incorporate provi-
sions in the lease that automatically reserve a portion of the security
deposit to meet a landlord obligation.371 There is often a presumption
written into a lease that any breach of the lease by the tenant, no matter
how trivial, gives rise to damages equal to the amount of the security
deposit. 37 2 Leases often simply grant landlords rights or privileges and
then assign them arbitrary monetary values.
373
" Albreqt v. Chen, 17 Ohio App. 3d 79, 81, 477 N.E.2d 1150 (1983).
367 Paxton, 25 Ohio B. at 355; Conyers v. Rushing, No. 79 AP-0426 (Hamilton County,
July 23, 1980)(landlord's claims included failure to clean the oven and carpet as the lease
required, broken or damaged oven, kitchen plumbing, screen door, Venetian blinds, and the
electric security system. It was further alleged that the tenant caused the building to be
infested with roaches and damaged the front lawn when moving out. The appellate court
overruled all assignments of error relating to the trier of fact's finding that the landlord
failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence either that the injuries complained of were
caused by the tenant or that the damages exceeded normal wear and tear).
" Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Mayor, No. 10-180 (Lake County, Mar. 1, 1985)(LEXIS,
States Library, Ohio File)(In absence of the transcript of the proceedings or statement of the
facts, the court found it impossible to determine whether repairs were the result of
extraordinary damages or the result of reasonable wear and tear).
369 Konig v. Bella Dora Mgmt., Inc., 9 Ohio Misc. 2d 7, 458 N.E.2d 477 (1983)(court
upheld repair and replacement costs but denied those for cleaning).
37o Carr v. Ed Stein Realtors, 10 Ohio App. 3d 242, 461 N.E.2d 930 (1983); Albreqt v.
Chen, 17 Ohio App. 3d 79, 477 N.E.2d 1150 (1983); Berlinger v. Suburban Apt. Mgmt. Co.,
7 Ohio App. 3d 122, 454 N.E.2d 1367 (1982); Riding Club Apts. v. Sargent, 2 Ohio App. 3d
146, 440 N.E.2d 1368 (1981).
371 See, e.g., Albreqt, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 81 (the lease declared that tenant agrees to pay
$60.00 for cleaning of carpeting upon vacation of the premises and the court held it may be
deducted from the security deposit over and above any other charges).
372 Carr, 10 Ohio App. 3d 242; Riding Club Apts., 2 Ohio App. 3d 146 (forfeiture of
security deposit when tenant vacates prior to end of lease term).
... Berlinger, 7 Ohio App. 3d 122 (a lease term prohibited motorcycles on the premises.
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The court in Riding Club Apartments v. Sargent374 reviewed a liqui-
dated damage clause first from the perspective of Ohio Revised Code
section 5321.06 that requires lease terms or other provisions governing
the landlord-tenant relationship to be consistent with the statute or other
rule of law. Also considered was Ohio Revised Code section 5321.13 which
bars certain rental agreement terms but not liquidated damage clauses.
Finally, the court discussed the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section
5321.16(B) and found a liquidated damage clause, otherwise enforceable,
inconsistent with the security deposit provision that limits deductions
from a security deposit to itemizations of "actual damages caused by
reason of the tenant's noncompliance with Ohio Revised Code section
5321.05 or the rental agreement .... -376
Lease terms requiring an automatic forfeiture of all or part of the
security deposit are quite common. While some of the deductions such
terms purport to justify are successfully contested by tenants, the aura of
legality conveyed by a printed lease misleads many tenants regarding
their ability to contest a specific written term. Therefore, a specific
prohibition of lease terms regarding security deposits inconsistent with
section 5321.16 should be enacted.376
The amount of attorney fees to be awarded in collecting the portion of
the security deposit which is wrongfully withheld is within the sound
discretion of the trial court.377 In one reported decision, the Court of
Appeals required the trial court to reconsider a $250 award of attorney
fees where $1,756.25 was requested because the lower court made no
specific finding that the time spent was inappropriate or the hourly rate
charged was excessive.3 78 In another case where the record was silent as
to the evidence before the court with regard to attorney fees, an appellate
court upheld an award of $100 on the ground that the proceedings were
to be presumed valid and error free.379 Similarly, in Hoerner v. GMS Mgt.
Co., Inc., 380 the court upheld an award of $2,000 in attorney fees where
the trial court had applied factors mentioned in the Code of Professional
Responsibility in reducing the request of $10,000. Any claim of abuse of
discretion must be supported by facts. 3 8 '
Landlord provided, by separate document, a waiver of the provision at a charge of $50.00 for
each day).
"7 2 Ohio App. 3d 146, 440 N.E.2d 1368 (1981).
375 Id. at 147.
376 See infra text setting forth Proposed Amendments to the current statute.
" Forquer v. Colony Club, 26 Ohio App. 3d 178, 180, 499 N.E.2d 7 (1985); Sherwin v.
Cabana Club Apts., 70 Ohio App. 2d 11, 433 N.E.2d 932 (1980)(error to permit the jury to
determine the amount of attorneys fees to be awarded).
37' Forquer, 26 Ohio App. 3d at 180.
17' Albreqt v. Chen, 17 Ohio App. 3d 79, 477 N.E.2d 1150 (1983).
380 No. 46736 (Cuyahoga County, Dec. 15, 1983).
' Boldan v. Suburban Apt. Mgmt. Co., No. 84AP-47089 (Cuyahoga County, Mar. 2,
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The need to provide a record establishing the reasonable value of
attorney fees is demonstrated by the discussion above. The manner
of establishing the record was resolved in the Eighth District Court of
Appeals in Berlinger v. Suburban Apt. Mgt. Co.382 The court held that the
amount of attorney fees should be decided by the court, not by the trier of
fact, because attorney fees are to be taxed as costs,383 and evidence in
affidavit or other documentary form including a trial transcript was
sufficient.384
The Act's potential for curbing abuse resulting from the unjustifiable
delay in returning the security deposits has not been realized. In order to
implement the original legislative intent, several amendments to the
statute are necessary. These are particularly important to achieve the
desired balancing of the equities.38 5
The inherent unfairness in allowing landlords to hold security deposits
interest free should be eliminated by requiring landlords to maintain
security deposits in separate or escrow accounts or by permitting the
landlord to use the money but requiring interest at a commercial rate to
be returned to the tenant annually.386 This would not deprive the
landlord of security in the event of any breach of the tenant's obligation
to either pay rent or to refrain from causing damage. The interest could
also be used, if necessary, to cover damages. This requirement also has
the advantage of discouraging demands for excessive security deposits. In
addition, the separation from the landlord's own cash assets protects
these tenant funds from a landlord's bankruptcy or transfer of ownership.
Another recommended precaution against the loss of security deposits
when title to rental property transfers is a provision attaching liability
for return of the security deposit to the person holding the landlord's
interest at the termination of the tenancy.38 7
In light of the Vardeman court's interpretation of the current security
1984)(claim of abuse of discretion in the award of attorney fees is denied where appellant
had barely demonstrated the claim).
382 7 Ohio App. 3d 122, 454 N.E.2d 1367 (1982).
"I Drake v. Menczer, 67 Ohio App. 2d 122, 425 N.E.2d 961 (1980).
3' Berlinger, 7 Ohio App. 3d 122; Drake, 67 Ohio App. 2d at 126, 425 N.E.2d at 964;
Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Watkins, 23 Ohio App. 3d 20, 491 N.E.2d 701 (1984).
311 "The Landlord-Tenant Act must be interpreted in such a manner that fair and
equitable treatment will be afforded to both landlords and tenants." Vardeman v.
Llewellyn, 17 Ohio St. 3d 24, 28, 476 N.E.2d 1038 (1985).
... H.B. No. 141 of the 117th Ohio General Assembly, 1987, introduced by Representa-
tive Hagan, would require interest to be paid on all portions of security deposits held for six
months or more at a rate of interest equal to the average prime rate charged by banks on
short-term business loans for January of the year during which the deposit is made, as
published by the Federal Reserve System. This proposal would more realistically reflect the
true nature of the transaction, i.e., a loan from the tenant to the landlord.
... UNW. REsnUENurIL LANDLORD-TENANT AcT, supra note 47, § 2:101(e) contains such a
provision.
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deposit section, amendments are needed to provide an adequate remedy
both for a landlord's failure to provide a timely accounting and for the
wrongful withholding of all or part of the security deposit. The ability to
avoid statutory penalties by asserting counterclaims for damages in
tenant security deposit actions, tends to promote litigation, rather than
negotiations between the parties.388
In order to promote the settlement of disputes without litigation, a
statutory penalty for failure to timely provide the tenant with either a
refund or an itemization of deductions, should be added to the Act.38 9 A
tenant who is forced to go to court to obtain information about the
disposition of his security deposit should be assured of reimbursements
for his costs. One option would be to mandate the double damages penalty
provision of subsection (C) whenever the landlord fails to comply with the
thirty-day requirement. An alternative would be a provision for statutory
damages of $200.00 and reasonable attorney fees as is provided in the
Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.3 90 Such a provision would limit the
liability of a landlord who inadvertently failed to deliver an itemization
of damages to the tenant but who has not wrongfully retained any of the
deposit, as in the Vardeman case. At the same time, it would relieve a
tenant of the financial burden caused by his being forced to litigate to
obtain, at the very least, an accounting of his deposit.
358 Vardeman, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 30 (dissenting opinion). A claim for the return of a
security deposit is often filed in small claims court. This forum is appropriate for relatively
small claims where the absence of legal training should not prevent just results. Katzin v.
Murad, No. 46553 (Cuyahoga County, Jan. 5, 1984). Of course, a landlord can still be
represented by counsel, and may even choose to have a case transfered by filing counter-
claims over $1500. The availability to the tenant of the relief provided by section
5321.16(C), which specifies the penalty of double damages, depends on being construed as
other than "punitive damages" which are proscribed by the enabling section of the Code.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(C) (Anderson 1981).
Section 1925.02, establishing a small claims division in municipal and county courts in
Ohio, precludes punitive damage claims. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1925.02 (Anderson 1981).
Courts have uniformly held that the allocation of statutory double damages under the Act
is not subject to a good faith exception and that proof of mental state is not necessary to
invoke this limited penalty. Forquer v. Colony Club, 26 Ohio App. 3d 178, 180, 499 N.E.2d
7 (1985); Paxton v. McGranahan, 25 Ohio B. 352 (1986); Katzin v. Murad, No. 46553
(Cuyahoga County, Jan. 5, 1984). Courts of Appeal of Cuyahoga and Franklin County which
have had the opportunity to review the appeal of small claims court awards of double
damages, have affirmed them in each case. Katzin v. Murad, No. 46553 (Cuyahoga County,
Jan. 5, 1984); Dwork v. Offenburg, 66 Ohio App. 2d 14, 419 N.E.2d 14 (1979), preserving
this forum for tenants seeking their full range of remedies under the Act.
... This would overrule any implication in Vardeman that a landlord may ignore the
time limits in the Act. The authors believe the Act already provides for this relief, but
Vardeman mandates a clear restatement of this principle by the General Assembly.
390 Ofio Rsv. CODE ANN. § 1345.09 (Anderson 1981).
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IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE OHIO LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
The authors have drafted provisions to resolve the problems identified
concerning the statute. These solutions are based in large part on the
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and the Model Residential
Landlord-Tenant Code.
The present law is cited where appropriate with proposed amendments
in italics.
Section 1923.08 Continuance and bond.
No continuance in an action under sections 1923.01 to 1923.14,
inclusive, of the Revised Code, shall be granted for a longer period than
eight days, unless the defendant, applying therefor, gives a bond in the
amount of any rent currently owed to the adverse party, with good and
sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge of the county court, who may
condition the approval of this bond on the timely payment to the court of
future rents that may accrue.
5321.01.0 Legislative purpose.
The Ohio General Assembly hereby finds that a significant proportion of
the rental housing in the State is substandard in structure, equipment,
sanitation, and maintenance; that the condition of this housing has had
and will continue to have, unless corrected, a deleterious effect on the
residents of this housing; that poorly maintained and overcrowded hous-
ing contributes to the development and spread of disease, crime, infant
mortality, juvenile delinquency, broken homes, and other physical, social,
and psychological problems, and constitutes a menace to the health, safety,
morals, and welfare of the residents of this State; that these conditions
have necessitated excessive and disproportionate expenditures of public
funds for crime prevention and punishment, for public health and safety,
and for other public services and facilities, and have impaired the efficient
and economic provision of government services by municipalities and the
State. Further, that these conditions result in part from the often unequal
bargaining power of landlords and tenants; that in order to facilitate fair
and equitable arrangements, to foster the development of housing which
will meet the minimum standards of the present day, and to promote the
health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people, it is necessary and
appropriate that the State specify certain minimum rights and remedies,
obligations and prohibitions, for landlords and tenants of certain kinds of
residential property.
5321.01
(C) "Residential premises" means a dwelling unit for residential use
and occupancy and the structure of which it is a part, the facilities and
appurtenances therein, and the grounds, areas, facilities for the use of
tenants generally or the use of which is promised the tenant. Residential
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premises does include units of cooperative housing corporations occupied
by shareholders thereof.
5321.02
(B) If a landlord acts in violation of division (A) of this section the
tenant may:
(1) Use the retaliatory action of the landlord as a defense to an action
by the landlord to recover possession of the premises;
(2) Recover possession of the premises; or
(3) Terminate the rental agreement.
In addition, the tenant shall recover from the landlord three times the
actual damages caused to the tenant or two hundred dollars, whichever is
greater, together with reasonable attorney fees.
(D) In an action by or against the tenant, evidence of a complaint with-
in one [1] year before the alleged act of retaliation creates a presumption
that the landlord's conduct was in retaliation. "Presumption" means that
the trier of fact must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and
until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its
nonexistence.
5321.03
(A) Notwithstanding section 5321.02 of the Revised Code, a landlord
may bring an action under Chapter 1923 of the Revised Code for
possession of the premises if the sole reason is shown to be that: ...
5321.04(B)
If the landlord violates any provision of this section, the tenant may
recover any actual damages which result from the violation together with
reasonable attorney fees. This remedy is an addition to any right of the
tenant to obtain injunctive relief to prevent the landlord in violation of
division (A)(8) of this section.
5321.05 (A)(7) should be deleted in its entirety.
5321.05(D)
If the tenant abandons the dwelling unit, the landlord shall make
reasonable efforts to rent it at a fair rental. If the landlord rents the
dwelling unit for a term beginning before the expiration of the rental
agreement, it terminates as of the date of the new tenancy. If the landlord
fails to use reasonable efforts to rent the dwelling unit at a fair rental or if
the landlord accepts the abandonment as a surrender, the rental agree-
ment is deemed to be terminated by the landlord as of the date the landlord
has notice of the abandonment. If the tenancy is from month to month or
week to week, the term of the rental agreement for this purpose is deemed
to be a month or a week, as the case may be.
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5321.06.01 [Promises in Rental Agreement Mutual and Dependent Inter-
pretation]
(1) Where a remedy is given to either party by this Chapter for particular
breach by the other party, this remedy shall be exclusive of any unmen-
tioned remedy arising by operation of existing law or by operation of
subsection (2) of this section.
(2) Material promises, agreements, covenants, or undertakings of any
kind to be performed by either party to a rental agreement shall be
interpreted as mutual and dependent conditions to the performance of
material promises, agreements, covenants, and undertakings by the other
party.
(3) A party undertaking to remedy a breach of the other party in
accordance with this Chapter shall be deemed to have complied with the
terms of this Chapter if his non-compliance with the exact instructions of
this Chapter is non-material and non-prejudicial to the other party.
5321.08 [Duties of clerk of court.]
(F) The clerk shall accept deposits of rent upon the receipt of an affidavit
from a tenant showing that the provisions of 5321.07 have been met.
5321.09 [Landlord may apply for release of rent.]
(B) The tenant shall be named as a party to any action filed by the
landlord under this section, and shall have the right to file an answer and
counterclaim, as in other civil cases. A trial shall be held within sixty
days of the date of filing of the landlord's complaint.
(E) If the court finds that there was a violation of an obligation imposed
by Section 5321.04 of the Revised Code or by the rental agreement, or by
any building, housing, health or safety code and that the condition was not
remedied at the time the rent was deposited, the tenant shall recover any
damages caused by the violation, including, but not limited to, the
reduction in value of the rented premises. If the court finds that there was
a violation of an obligation, the tenant shall be awarded reasonable
attorney fees, whether or not the tenant is also awarded actual damages for
the violation.
5321.13 [Rental agreement terms barred.]
(G) No agreement by a tenant to pay a liquidated damage shall be
recognized in any rental agreement for residential premises or in any other
agreement between the landlord and tenant.
(H) No agreement by a tenant to waive the right to a jury trial shall be
recognized in any rental agreement for residential premises or in any other
agreement between the landlord and tenant.
(I) No agreement by a tenant for automatic renewal for more than one
month shall be recognized in any rental agreement for residential premises
or in any other agreement between the landlord and tenant.
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(J) No agreement by a tenant to automatically forfeit all or any part of
a security deposit upon a breach of the rental agreement by the tenant shall
be recognized in a rental agreement for residential premises or any other
agreement between the landlord and tenant.
(K) A provision prohibited by this section included in a rental agreement
is unenforceable. If a landlord knowingly uses a rental agreement contain-
ing provisions to be prohibited, the tenant shall recover in addition to his
actual damages, the amount of three months periodic rent and reasonable
attorney fees.
5321.15 [Residential premises landlord restrictions.]
(C) A landlord who violates this section is liable in a civil action for
three times the actual damages caused to a tenant or to a tenant whose
right to possession has terminated or two hundred dollars, whichever is
greater, together with reasonable attorney fees.
5321.16 [Security deposit procedures.]
(A) A landlord may not demand or receive security, however denomi-
nated, in an amount or value in excess of one [1] month[s] periodic rent.
Such security deposit shall be kept in a separate interest bearing escrow
account. This account shall bear interest at the rate of five per cent per
annum if the tenant remains in possession of the premises for six months
or more, and shall be computed and paid annually by the landlord to the
tenant. This account shall be held and administered for the benefit of the
tenant. The tenant's claim to such money shall be prior to that of any
creditor of the landlord, including a trustee in bankruptcy, even if such
security funds are unlawfully co-mingled. Upon the transfer of a residen-
tial premises, any monies in this account shall be transferred to the new
landlord.
(C) If the landlord fails to comply with any provision of division (A) or
(B) of this section the tenant shall recover three times the property or money
due him or two hundred dollars, whichever is greater, together with
reasonable attorney fees.
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